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INTRODUCTION 
Congress recently enacted the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
(“CAFA”)1 to expand federal jurisdiction over class action lawsuits.2  
Congress was particularly alarmed by the targeting of plaintiff-
friendly jurisdictions in state courts for the determination of lawsuits 
of national scope and interest.3  This type of forum shopping has 
thrived in recent years in the securities context.  Stemming from the 
largest corporate frauds in history such as Enron and WorldCom, 
lawsuits have proliferated in state courts across the country for the 
sole purpose of avoiding federal court jurisdiction.4  Despite 
addressing these very concerns in the general class action context, 
Congress curiously exempted the federal securities laws from the 
provisions of CAFA.5  The explanation is apparent:  an 
underappreciation of the overly nuanced jurisdictional framework for 
private rights of action under the federal securities laws. 
Private rights of action have been an integral part of the federal 
securities enforcement scheme since its original formulation in the 
wake of the stock market crash of 1929.6  These provisions are, in 
essence, a means of investor protection.  With the ebbs and flows of 
the securities markets, however, investor protection has been a 
fluctuating concept in the eyes of Congress.  In bad times, investors 
merit protection from corporate wrongdoers and securities 
                                                          
 1. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.). 
 2. Id. § 2(b)(2) (explaining that the purpose of CAFA is to grant federal courts 
the ability to consider interstate cases of national significance under diversity 
jurisdiction). 
 3. See infra notes 150-153 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra Part II.B. 
 5. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 4(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(9)(A) 
(West Supp. 2005) (explaining that diversity jurisdiction, as provided under Section 
1332(d)(2), is inapplicable to any class action that only involves a claim concerning a 
security “as defined under section 16(f)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 and section 
28(f)(5)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934”) (citation omitted); id. § 5(a), 
28 U.S.C. § 1453(d)(1) (exempting from removal to federal district court as 
provided under Section 1453 class actions that only involve a claim concerning a 
security “defined under section 16(f)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 and section 
28(f)(5)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934”) (citation omitted). 
 6. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 9 (1933) (providing victims of fraudulent securities 
schemes with the ability to recover the securities’ purchase price or damages where 
the sellers made false statements, omissions, or otherwise failed to exhibit due care). 
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professionals manipulating the markets.7  In good times, investors 
become the pawns of plaintiffs’ lawyers seeking to exploit their 
clients’ misfortunes for their own gains.8  Under these competing 
forces, the evolution of the private rights of action under the federal 
securities laws is far from a model of clarity or consistency. 
One form of investor protection has been particularly mangled in 
this tug-of-war:  the non-removal provision of the Securities Act of 
1933 (“1933 Act”).9  Although state and federal courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims,10 a defendant cannot 
remove 1933 Act claims filed in state court to federal court.11  In 
effect, Congress took the unusual step of preventing federal claims 
from being heard in federal court.12  Congress took the contrary 
position the following year when enacting the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”),13 by vesting the federal courts with exclusive 
jurisdiction over claims thereunder.14 
                                                          
 7. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2 (2002) (commenting that the “Corporate 
and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002” plays an essential role in 
reestablishing trust in the financial markets by faithfully preventing, exposing, and 
prosecuting corporate fraud); id. at 17 (extending the statute of limitations for 
victims of securities frauds so as to prevent unduly burdening their right to recovery); 
S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 1 (1933) (describing the fundamental policy of the 1933 Act as 
protecting the public from fraud and misrepresentation in securities sales); H.R. REP. 
NO. 73-85, at 2 (recognizing that the “mass of essentially fraudulent securities” 
demanded congressional action); H.R. REP. NO. 73-152, at 1 (1933) (Conf. Rep.) 
(explaining that the purpose of the 1933 Act is to prevent fraudulent sales of 
securities in interstate or foreign commerce). 
 8. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731 (describing how investors are always the “ultimate losers” 
when issuers are victims of “extortionate ‘settlements’”); 144 CONG. REC. H6059-60 
(daily ed. July 21, 1998) (statement of Rep. Cox) (commenting that securities 
plaintiffs’ lawyers brought lawsuits for their own benefit, not for their allegedly 
defrauded clients); id. (remarking that more than one half of the top 150 companies 
in Silicon Valley alone were victims of such exploitative suits and that plaintiffs 
received only between six and fourteen cents on the dollar in settlements). 
 9. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77a-bbbb (2000)). 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Claims arising under federal law generally fall within the original jurisdiction 
of federal courts and are subject to removal.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (granting 
federal district courts with original jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under 
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”); id. § 1441(a) (“Except as 
otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of 
which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be 
removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United 
States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is 
pending.”) (emphasis added). 
 13. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a-mm (2000)). 
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. 
COOK.OFFTOPRINTER 2/22/2006  2:34:45 PM 
624 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:621 
This bipartite jurisdictional framework remains today, but with 
even greater nuance imposed by the recent wave of federal securities 
legislation.  In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Law 
Reform Act (“PSLRA”)15 to add a number of procedural and pleading 
requirements on federal securities claims—particularly those under 
the 1934 Act.16  It soon became obvious that plaintiffs could sidestep 
the PSLRA by filing actions under state law and/or in state court.17  
Congress quickly sought to close this loophole by enacting the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”),18 
which subjected class actions “based upon the statutory or common 
law of any State” to removal to federal court and preemption by 
federal law.19 
However, state law was not the only loophole.  The heart of the 
PSLRA—the heightened pleading requirements for securities fraud 
class actions—does not apply to 1933 Act claims.20  Nor does SLUSA, 
which by its plain language applies only to state law claims.21  Via the 
non-removal provision, plaintiffs could therefore file 1933 Act claims 
in state court to seek recovery for the same securities fraud without 
the strictures of SLUSA and much of the PSLRA.22  Indeed, purely for 
jurisdictional purposes, plaintiffs’ lawyers have filed scores of 
individual actions exclusively under the 1933 Act in state court as one 
segment of the massive litigation stemming from the largest 
corporate frauds in history.23  In the process, this “de facto class 
                                                          
 15. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
 16. See infra notes 102-112 and accompanying text. 
 17. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 14-15 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (observing that 
plaintiffs’ lawyers have evaded the PSLRA’s provisions that protect against 
exploitative suits by filing “frivolous and speculative suits in State court, where 
essentially none of the [PSLRA]’s procedural or substantive protections against 
abusive suits are available”); Michael A. Perino, A Census of Securities Class Action 
Litigation After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in 1015 CORPORATE 
LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES:  SECURITIES LITIGATION, 1043, 1046 
(Practicing Law Institute 1997) (revealing that securities class action suits shifted 
significantly from federal to state court as a result of plaintiffs’ wishing to evade the 
“procedural and substantive hurdles” Congress created with the passage of the 
PSLRA). 
 18. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.). 
 19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b)-(c), 78bb(b)-(c) (2000). 
 20. See id. § 78u-4(b) (applying heightened pleading requirements to “any private 
action” arising under the 1934 Act). 
 21. See infra Part II.A. 
 22. See infra Part II.A-B. 
 23. For example, in the case of WorldCom, one law firm has filed at least forty-
seven individual actions in state court on behalf of 120 plaintiffs in at least eight 
states.  See Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 
2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1080 (2005); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No.  Civ.02-
3288, 2003 WL 22701241, at *5 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2003) (recognizing that 
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action”24 in state court has frustrated the parallel litigation 
consolidated in federal court.25 
Congress has not addressed this conspicuous loophole in the wake 
of SLUSA.  Remarkably, despite enacting measures in CAFA that 
seem custom-made to combat this forum shopping,26  Congress 
decided expressly to exempt the federal securities laws therefrom.27  
The stated reason for this exemption was “not to disturb the carefully 
crafted framework” of jurisdiction over securities claims established 
in SLUSA.28  Given the obvious shortcomings of SLUSA, however, this 
exemption begs the question:  what exactly does Congress intend its 
jurisdictional “framework” for securities claims to be? 
This Article offers a solution to this quagmire that continues to 
elude both Congress and the federal courts.  Part I of this Article 
provides an overview of the sequence of legislation that has shaped 
private securities actions and, more specifically, their jurisdictional 
provisions.  That sequence comprises:  (1) the 1933 Act and the 
“interrelated” provisions of the 1934 Act;29 (2) the substantial 
revisions to private securities litigation in the 1990s in the PSLRA and 
SLUSA;30 and (3) the recent enactments of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley Act”)31 and CAFA which, despite having less 
direct impact on private securities litigation, suggest how to remedy 
the federal securities jurisdictional framework in a manner consistent 
with current legislative intent.32 
                                                          
plaintiffs’ law firm chose “to file as many cases as possible” for its clients in various 
states and sought to prevent removal and consolidation of the cases to a “single 
federal court by the MDL Panel”); id. (finding that the plaintiffs’ law firm, cognizant 
that filing 1934 Act claims would provide a basis for removal to federal court, avoided 
filing 1934 Act claims altogether, even if filing those claims would “increase a 
plaintiff’s leverage”). 
 24. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 22701241, at *6. 
 25. See infra Part II.B. 
 26. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 4(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3) 
(West Supp. 2005) (delineating a number of qualitative factors federal courts may 
consider in exercising jurisdiction, including “whether the class action has been 
pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction” and whether “other 
class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the same or other 
persons have been filed”). 
 27. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 28. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 50 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 46-47 
(revealing that the Committee’s desire to leave Congress’s previously enacted 
framework governing the adjudication of covered securities claims undisturbed 
prompted it to exclude such claims from  jurisdiction conferred by Section 1332(b)). 
 29. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976) (characterizing private 
rights of action under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act as “interrelated components of 
the federal regulatory scheme governing securities transactions”).  See infra Part I.A. 
 30. See infra Part I.B-C. 
 31. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.).  See infra Part I.D. 
 32. See infra Part I.E. 
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Part II discusses recent judicial interpretations of the non-removal 
provision of the 1933 Act in light of its amendment by SLUSA.  
Courts have had to grapple with not only how to interpret the plain 
language of the amendment (especially in light of clear legislative 
intent to the contrary),33 but also how to minimize the actual 
exploitation of its loopholes as highlighted in the massive litigation 
generated by the likes of Enron and WorldCom.34  Judicial 
uncertainty on both issues—coupled with the expanse and impact of 
the exploitation—highlight the need for immediate legislative reform 
in the manner proposed here. 
Part III details a proposed amendment to the non-removal 
provision of the 1933 Act as a means of harmonizing the overall 
jurisdictional framework for private rights of action under the federal 
securities laws.  Specifically, the non-removal provision should be 
amended to permit removal of those 1933 Act claims which “sound in 
fraud”—that is, those premised on allegations of fraudulent 
conduct.35  This proposal has a number of advantages.  First, the 
proposal reinforces a growing trend in federal securities litigation 
and jurisprudence to apply certain federal procedural and securities 
provisions to claims of fraud in both form and substance.36  Second, 
the proposal would make the federal securities jurisdictional 
framework consistent with various expressions of legislative intent by:  
(1) preserving a plaintiff’s choice of forum as presumably intended in 
the original enactment of the non-removal provision in 1933;37 
(2) curtailing the forum shopping targeted—but thus far missed—in 
the PSLRA and SLUSA in the 1990s;38 and (3) reflecting a number of 
                                                          
 33. See infra Part II.A. 
 34. See infra Part II.B. 
 35. See infra Part III.  As discussed infra, plaintiffs can bring 1933 Act claims for 
misrepresentations and omissions on theories of fraud, negligence, or strict liability.  
See infra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.  Regardless of the theory, 1933 Act 
claims are often premised on the same allegations of fraudulent conduct as an 
accompanying or substitute claim for fraud under the 1934 Act.  See, e.g., Crowe v. 
Deutsch Bank Alex Brown, 330 F. Supp. 2d 813, 818 (S.D. Miss. 2004) (commenting 
that the alleged misconduct at issue in the plaintiff’s 1933 Act claim falls within the 
scope of the “alleged scheme or ‘course of conduct’ to defraud” that is the basis of 
the 1934 Act claim); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 315 F. Supp. 2d 527, 537 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (explaining that the 1933 Act claims against WorldCom in state 
court arose from the “same underlying financial fraud” that forms the basis of the 
1934 Act claims in federal court); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. Civ.02-3288, 
2003 WL 22701241, at *5 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2003) (recognizing the strategy to 
eschew the filing of 1934 Act claims that could have been brought along with or in 
lieu of 1933 Act claims based on fraud allegations). 
 36. See infra Part III.A-B. 
 37. See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text. 
 38. See infra Part I.B-C. 
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the measures recently implemented in CAFA in 2005.39  Third, this 
proposal would nullify yet another byproduct of forum shopping:  
piecemeal litigation of “otherwise non-removable” claims under 
Section 1441(c) of the general removal statutes.40  Fourth, the 
proposal would promote both judicial economy and fairness to 
investors by streamlining the “race for [the] assets”41 in securities 
fraud litigation under uniform standards in federal court.42 
I. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND 
A. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
The 1933 Act was the federal legislative entrée into the realm of 
securities regulation.  Although state regulation was pervasive at that 
time, new legislation at the federal level was deemed necessary to 
protect and restore investor confidence in the wake of the stock 
market crash of 1929.43  Congress expressed particular concern over 
fraudulent activities in the securities markets.44 
In calling for legislative action, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
implored Congress to “add[ ] to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, 
the further doctrine ‘let the seller also beware.’”45  In response, 
Congress sought to establish a regulatory framework ensuring the 
exchange of reliable and honest information in the securities 
                                                          
 39. See infra Part III.C. 
 40. See infra Part III.D.  28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2000) provides: 
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the 
jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one or more 
otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be 
removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its 
discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates. 
 41. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(remarking that unconsolidated litigation in different fora is “duplicative and 
wasteful,” that it inevitably promotes a “race” for the finite funds available for the 
victims involved, and possibly deprives victims of the recovery to which they are 
entitled). 
 42. See infra Part III.E. 
 43. See S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 2 (1933) (explaining that “dire national distress” after 
the investment of “billions of dollars” in worthless securities demanded congressional 
action); H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933) (finding that legislation was necessary in 
light of the fact that half of securities offered in 1920s were worthless); see also Ernst 
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976) (commenting that the federal 
regulation of securities transactions ensued in the wake of the stock market crash of 
1929). 
 44. See S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 1 (remarking that the 1933 Act aimed to protect the 
public from “further exploitation” by preventing the future sales of “unsound, 
fraudulent, and worthless securities”); H.R. REP. NO. 73-152, at 1 (1933) (Conf. Rep.) 
(describing the purpose of the 1933 Act as preventing fraudulent sales of securities 
in interstate commerce); H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (noting the devastating 
repercussions of the sale of fraudulent securities). 
 45. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2. 
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markets.46  Specifically, its primary objectives were the “full disclosure 
of every essentially important element attending the issue of a new 
security,” and a “demand that persons, whether they be directors, 
experts, or underwriters, who sponsor the investment of other 
people’s money should be held to the high standards of 
trusteeship.”47 
The 1933 Act effectuated these goals by imposing a flurry of 
requirements upon issuers, underwriters, and dealers to make full 
and fair disclosures in securities offerings.48  The 1933 Act provides 
for express private rights of action as part of its enforcement scheme.  
Under Section 11 of the 1933 Act (“Section 11”), purchasers of 
securities may sue for material misrepresentations or omissions in 
registration statements as long as they did not know of the 
misrepresentation or omission at the time of purchase.49  The 
purchaser may sue the following under Section 11:  (1) any person 
who signed the registration statement;50 (2) any person who was a 
director or partner of the issuer at the time of the filing of the 
registration statement;51 (3) any person listed in the registration 
statement as a soon-to-be director or partner;52 (4) any person who 
has prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, such 
as accountants, engineers, appraisers, or other professionals (e.g., 
lawyers);53 or (5) any underwriter of the securities.54  Under Section 
12 of the 1933 Act (“Section 12”), a purchaser of securities may sue 
the offeror or seller for any material misrepresentation or omission in 
prospectuses or oral communications.55 
                                                          
 46. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 705-06 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 47. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 3. 
 48. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2000) (specifying information required to be 
disclosed in registration statements); id. § 77j (specifying information required to be 
disclosed in prospectuses); id. § 77aa (specifying schedules of information required 
in registration statements). 
 49. Id. § 77k. 
 50. The 1933 Act requires the registration statement to be signed by: 
[E]ach issuer, its principal executive officer or officers, its principal financial 
officer, its comptroller or principal accounting officer, and the majority of its 
board of directors or persons performing similar functions (or, if there is no 
board of directors or persons performing similar functions, by the majority 
of the persons or board having the power of management of the issuer). . . . 
Id. § 77f. 
 51. Id. § 77k(a)(2). 
 52. Id. § 77k(a)(3). 
 53. Id. § 77k(a)(4). 
 54. Id. § 77k(a)(5); see also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 
n.22 (1983) (noting that other corporate officers, lawyers “not acting as ‘experts,’ 
and accountants with respect to parts of a registration statement which they are not 
named as having prepared or certified” are not subject to liability under Section 11). 
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 77l. 
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Congress based the 1933 Act in large part on pre-existing state 
statutory and common law, but imposed fewer pleading requirements 
as a form of greater investor protection from fraud.56  Specifically, the 
1933 Act deviated from common-law fraud principles by not 
requiring plaintiffs to prove reliance (except in one circumstance),57 
loss causation,58 or any particular state of mind of any defendant.59  
“This throws upon originators of securities a duty of competence as 
well as innocence which the history of recent spectacular failures 
overwhelmingly justifies.”60  These special rules also reflected the 
inferior access of purchasers to information regarding securities.61  
While liability under these civil liability provisions is “virtually 
absolute” for the issuer “even for innocent misstatements,”62 other 
defendants have a “due diligence” affirmative defense of varying 
degrees63 depending on their importance in this “scheme of 
                                                          
 56. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 711 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (noting that securities fraud was not a novel problem in 1933, 
but that many States had tried to remedy it by enacting “blue sky” statutes); id. 
(explaining further that when Congress addressed this issue, it “explicitly drew” from 
the experience of the States). 
 57. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (requiring that a Section 11 plaintiff prove reliance on 
alleged misrepresentation or omission only if “such person acquired the security 
after the issuer has made generally available to its security holders an earning 
statement covering a period of at least twelve months beginning after the effective 
date of the registration statement”). 
 58. Plaintiffs need not prove loss causation under Sections 11 and 12.  Id. 
§§ 77k(e), 77l(b).  Rather, defendants may assert loss causation as an affirmative 
defense—namely, that a lower stock value did not result from the alleged 
misrepresentations or omissions.  Id. 
 59. See Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382 (finding that a plaintiff who has 
purchased a security pursuant to a registration statement need only show a “material 
misstatement or omission” to make his prima facie case); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 
427, 431 (1953) (finding that the 1933 Act differs greatly from common-law action by 
creating a right to recover for misrepresentation where it is the seller who has the 
burden of proving “lack of scienter”), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 60. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 9 (1933); see also id. (explaining that Section 11 
creates “correspondingly heavier legal liability” in line with responsibility of issuers 
and securities professionals to the investing public). 
 61. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435 (reasoning that because issuers and securities 
professionals have “better opportunities” to research and evaluate the “prospective 
earnings and business plans affecting securities” than buyers, it is entirely reasonable 
for Congress to place buyers of securities “covered by the [1933] Act on a different 
basis from other purchasers”); Securities Act:  Hearings on S. 875 Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 207 (1933) (statement of Hon. Alexander 
Holtzoff) (framing the question on who should bear the burden of liability as 
follows:  “Let us assume that an innocent mistake is made and an investor loses 
money because of it.  Now, who should suffer?  The man who loses the money or the 
man who puts the mistake in circulation knowing that other people will rely upon 
that mistaken statement?”); H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 9 (concluding that it is necessary 
to place the burden of disproving responsibility for fraudulent acts of “omission or 
commission” on those who issue statements to the public). 
 62. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382. 
 63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(b), 77l(a)(2). 
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distribution.”64  This essentially created a negligence standard for 
these other actors.65 
The following year, Congress enacted the 1934 Act in order to 
protect investors from fraudulent practices in securities exchanges 
and over-the-counter markets.66  For example, Section 10(b) of the 
1934 Act (“Section 10(b)”) makes it unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . , any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors.”67  Although Congress did 
not establish express civil remedies under Section 10(b), courts have 
since firmly established implied private rights of action for violations 
thereof and of Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Rule 
10b-5 (“Rule 10b-5”),68 which was later promulgated in 1942.69 
Sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act and Section 10(b) of the 1934 
Act are “interrelated components of the federal regulatory scheme 
governing transactions in securities.”70  While the same conduct may 
be actionable under either statute, “the two provisions involve distinct 
causes of action and were intended to address different types of 
wrongdoing.”71  Indeed, both Congress and the courts have defined 
the contours of the implied Section 10(b) claim largely in light of 
what is expressly provided with respect to 1933 Act claims.72  As a 
                                                          
 64. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 9. 
 65. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208 (1976). 
 66. See S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 1-2 (1934) (responding to President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s concern that “naked speculation has been made far too alluring and far 
too easy for those who could and for those who could not afford to gamble.  Such 
speculation has run the scale from the individual who has risked his pay envelop [sic] 
or his meager savings on a margin transaction involving stocks with whose true value 
he was wholly unfamiliar, to the pool of individuals or corporations with large 
resources, often not their own, which sought by manipulation to raise or depress 
market quotations far out of line with reason, all of this resulting in loss to the 
average investor, who is of necessity personally uninformed.”). 
 67. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 68. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004). 
 69. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 196 (noting that although Section 10(b) 
does not on its face create an express civil remedy, nor is there any indication that 
Congress intended such a remedy, the existence of a private cause of action under 
the Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 is well-established (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 
U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 
6, 13 n.9 (1971))). 
 70. Id. at 206. 
 71. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381 (1983). 
 72. See id. at 384 (noting the “cumulative construction of the remedies under the 
1933 and 1934 Acts”). 
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result, plaintiffs face a far different set of procedural and substantive 
requirements for each cause of action.73 
While Sections 11 and 12 are limited to certain parties and forms 
of disclosure, Section 10(b) is a “catchall” antifraud provision 
applicable to “any person” having used “any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance” in connection with the purchase or 
sale of “any security.”74  To provide some control over this wide range 
of potential claims, courts have imposed a number of substantive 
burdens on Section 10(b) plaintiffs, including a scienter and loss 
causation requirement.75  While lacking these substantive 
requirements, “each of the express civil remedies in the 1933 Act 
allowing recovery for negligent conduct is subject to significant 
procedural restrictions not applicable under § 10(b).”76  Specifically, 
unlike their Section 10(b) counterparts, Section 11 and 12 plaintiffs 
must post security for costs and satisfy an express statute of 
limitations.77  These unique features of 1933 Act and 1934 Act claims 
serve to counterbalance each other.78  For example, without the 
substantive requirements read into Section 10(b) claims, plaintiffs 
could just proceed thereunder and avoid the 1933 Act procedural 
requirements, “thereby nullify[ing] the effectiveness of the carefully 
drawn procedural restrictions on these express actions.”79 
                                                          
 73. See SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969) (recognizing an 
“interdependence of the various sections of the securities laws” but reaffirming that 
even particular phrases may have different meanings between the 1933 and 1934 
Acts). 
 74. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).  See Herman & 
MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382 (describing plaintiff’s burden under Section 10(b)).  
 75. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1633 (2005) (stating that 
plaintiffs are required to prove that their economic loss was proximately caused by 
the defendant’s misrepresentation or fraud for all Section 10(b) claims); Ernst & 
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 (holding that an allegation of “scienter” intent to deceive, 
defraud or manipulate is required for Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 private actions for 
damages). 
 76. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 208-09 (citations omitted). 
 77. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 77m.  Congress added these requirements just one 
year after enacting the 1933 Act to deter actions being brought solely for settlement 
value.  See 78 CONG. REC. 8668 (1934) (statement of Sen. Fletcher) (noting criticisms 
that the 1933 Act “is too drastic, and is interfering with business.  We have tried to 
meet those objections by this amendment”); id. at 8669 (statement of Sen. Fletcher) 
(emphasizing that amendments to Section 11 of the 1933 Act served as “a defense 
against blackmail suits as well as a defense against purely contentious litigation on 
the part of the defendant”); 78 CONG. REC. 10185 (1934) (statement of Sen. Byrnes) 
(arguing that “[t]here can be no doubt that the provisions of the existing law caused 
many men who were serving as directors of corporations to fear that they might be 
subjected to so-called ‘strike suits’ as the result of the administration of that law”). 
 78. Indeed, the bond requirement and express statute of limitations in the 1933 
Act were enacted in conjunction with the 1934 Act.  See Pub. L. No. 73-291, §§ 206, 
207, 48 Stat. 881, 907-08 (1934). 
 79. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 210. 
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Most relevant to this Article, 1933 Act and 1934 Act claims also 
differ in terms of their respective jurisdictional provisions.  Section 22 
of the 1933 Act provides that federal courts and state courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction over any private cause of action under the 
1933 Act.80  However, “no case arising under [the 1933 Act] and 
brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction shall be 
removed to any court of the United States.”81  Conversely, Congress 
expressly provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction of claims brought 
under the 1934 Act.82 
As numerous commentators have noted, there is little—if any—
legislative history underlying the non-removal provision of the 1933 
Act.83  The grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction for 1934 Act claims 
just one year later casts an even darker shadow.84  Indeed, in 1934, 
Congress acknowledged the conflict between the non-removal 
                                                          
 80. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).  The jurisdictional provisions of the 1933 Act also apply to 
the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.  Id. § 77vvv(b). 
 81. Id. § 77v(a). 
 82. See id. § 78aa (stating that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over 
violations of the 1934 Act).  Federal courts also have exclusive jurisdiction over SEC 
actions for breach of fiduciary duty under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.  Id. 
§ 80a-35.  Other federal securities laws have hybrid jurisdictional provisions of 
concurrent jurisdiction with no limitations on removal to federal court.  See Public 
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79y; Investment Company Act of 
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43; Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14. 
 83. See, e.g., Allan Horwich, Section 11 of the Securities Act:  The Cornerstone Needs 
Some Tuckpointing, 58 BUS. LAW. 1, 40 n.241 (2002), citing Paul Horton, Section 17(a) 
of the 1933 Securities Act—The Wrong Place for a Private Right, 68 NW. U. L. REV. 44, 56 
n.32 (1973) (noting the lack of legislative history explaining Section 22 of the 
Securities Act). 
 84. The grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction was heavily debated in Congress.  
See, e.g., 78 CONG. REC. 8099, 8571 (1934).  However, the legislative history is silent as 
to the reason for the grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction.  See Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 383 (1996) (“The legislative history of the 
[1934] Act elucidates no specific purpose on the part of Congress in enacting [the 
exclusive federal jurisdiction provision].”).  Courts have been left to infer that the 
purpose of this provision was “to achieve greater uniformity of construction and 
more effective and expert application of that law.”  Id. (quoting Murphy v. Gallagher, 
761 F.2d 878, 885 (2d Cir. 1985)).  Some commentators have suggested that 
Congress granted exclusive federal jurisdiction in order to safeguard express actions 
under the 1934 Act with heavy burdens on plaintiffs or of a highly technical nature 
with no basis in state common law.  See Margaret V. Sachs, Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction 
for Implied Rule 10b-5 Actions:  The Emperor Has No Clothes, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 559, 580-81 
(1988) (arguing that the heavy burden of proof required by sections 9(e) and 18(a) 
of the 1934 Act may have caused Congress to grant exclusive jurisdiction to federal 
courts under the assumption that these courts would be sensitive to underlying 
federal policies and could provide investors with a viable remedy); Louis Loss, The 
SEC Proxy Rules and State Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1249, 1275 (1960) (“The 1934 act is 
considerably more technical, and contains some provisions . . . which go much 
further beyond the common law than anything in the 1933 act.  The logical 
inference from these Delphic indications is that the exclusive-federal-jurisdiction 
provision in the 1934 act was motivated by a desire to achieve a greater uniformity of 
construction, and perhaps a more sympathetic judicial approach . . . .”). 
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provision of the 1933 Act and the exclusive federal jurisdiction 
provision of the 1934 Act,85 and even considered an amendment to 
grant exclusive federal jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims.86  However, 
Congress did not amend the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act at 
that time.87  “So far as the legislative history shows, the difference in 
these two related statutes is pure happenstance.”88 
It is surprising that Congress would have been silent in its 
legislative history when taking the unconventional measure of 
preventing the removal of federal law claims to federal court.  
Indeed, that provision of the 1933 Act is in a rather exclusive club of 
federal non-removal provisions.89  Despite their substantive 
dissimilarities, these similarly unique provisions, for which there are 
indications of legislative intent, may shed light on the rationale 
behind the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act. 
Courts have generally noted that such “allocations of jurisdiction 
have been carefully wrought to the realities of power and interest and 
national policy.”90  One such “reality” is a “complementary, historic 
interacting federal-state relationship” over a particular subject, with 
state authority not to be disturbed by removal of related actions to 
federal court.91  Other interests served in federal non-removal 
provisions include reducing the burdens on federal courts,92 
                                                          
 85. See 78 CONG. REC. 8571 (1934) (statement of Sen. Byrnes) (noting that the 
Senate version of the bill is identical to the 1933 Act in terms of jurisdiction, but that 
in contrast, the House bill gives exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts). 
 86. See id. at 8717 (statement of James Landis) (noting that the proposed 
amendment would eliminate concurrent jurisdiction of federal and state courts for 
the enforcement of the 1933 Act). 
 87. As discussed infra, the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act remained 
unchanged until 1998.  See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 
§ 101(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77v (2000) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 77v by adding “[e]xcept 
as provided in Section 77p(c) of this title”). 
 88. A.L.I., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL 
COURTS 183 (1969). 
 89. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 3612 (2000) (claims under the Condominium and 
Cooperative Abuse Relief Act of 1980); 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000) (admiralty actions 
under the “saving to suitors” clause); id. § 1445(a) (actions under the Federal 
Employers Liability Act); id. § 1445(b) (certain actions against common carriers 
under the Interstate Commerce Act); id. § 1445(c) (actions arising under state 
worker’s compensation laws); id. § 1445(d) (actions arising under the Violence 
Against Women Act); 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (2000) (actions arising under the Jones 
Act); 46 U.S.C. § 761 (2000) (actions under the Death on the High Seas Act). 
 90. Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 375 (1959). 
 91. See id. at 372 (noting that the “unquestioned aim” of the “saving to suitors” 
clause’s prohibition of removal of certain admiralty matters was to prevent 
“considerable inroads into the traditionally exercised concurrent jurisdiction of the 
state courts in admiralty matters”); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 
U.S. 310, 313 (1955) (explaining that the federal government has left significant 
regulatory power with the states, especially in the fields of maritime contracts and 
torts). 
 92. See, e.g., Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence 
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preserving a plaintiff’s choice of forum,93 and preventing the 
“federalization” of traditional areas of state law.94  Applying these 
rationales to the 1933 Act and its overall pro-plaintiff nature, one 
court concluded that the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act, “like 
others of the same genre, has the evident purpose of favoring 
plaintiffs’ choice of forum.”95 
B. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
Private rights of action under the federal securities laws remained 
mostly untouched for decades, until Congress embarked on a series 
of securities legislation in 1995 with the passage of the PSLRA.96  This 
legislation was heralded as “the most momentous event in the history 
of securities regulation since the adoption of the Securities Acts in 
1933 and 1934,”97 and was intended to curb abuses in private 
securities litigation.98  Securities fraud actions were the main culprit.  
“These suits, which unnecessarily increase the cost of raising capital 
and chill corporate disclosure, are often based on nothing more than 
a company’s announcement of bad news, not evidence of fraud.”99  As 
                                                          
Against Women Act:  A Defense, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 26 (2000) (recognizing 
concerns at both the state and federal level that the creation of a civil rights remedy 
in the Violence Against Women Act would unnecessarily burden the courts); Horton 
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 351 (1961) (noting that Section 1445(c) 
reflects congressional concern for congestion in federal courts); S. REP. NO. 85-1830, 
at 9 (1958), as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3105-06 (justifying the prohibition 
on removing workman’s compensation claims to federal courts under Section 
1445(c) because such a prohibition would help alleviate the burden on the federal 
courts). 
 93. See Horton, 367 U.S. at 351-52 (noting congressional concern for heavier trial 
burdens on worker’s compensation plaintiffs in federal court); S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 
9, as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3106 (stating that Section 1445(c) intended 
to preserve worker’s compensation plaintiffs’ choice to avail themselves of 
procedural advantages of proceeding in state court the non-removal provision gives 
the plaintiff the option of filing his claim in state or federal court). 
 94. See Biden, supra note 92, at 26 (noting, for instance, that Section 1445(d) was 
enacted to prevent federalization of domestic relations law); S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 
3106 (noting that worker’s compensation cases exist only by virtue of state law and 
involve no federal question). 
 95. Pinto v. Maremont Corp., 326 F. Supp. 165, 167 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (stating 
that federal non-removal provisions apply to “tort actions in which Congress wishes 
to give the plaintiff an absolute choice of forum” (citing WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 
§ 38 n.28 (2d ed.))). 
 96. Brian S. Sommer, The PSLRA Decade of Decadence:  Improving Balance in the 
Private Securities Arena with a Screening Approach, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 413 (2005) (noting 
that the PSLRA brought sweeping changes to the procedural rules for securities 
claims). 
 97. Harold S. Bloomenthal, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act—How Safe Is 
the Safe Harbor?, SEC. & FED. CORP. L. REP., Jan. 1996, at 1. 
 98. See generally S. REP. NO. 104-98 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679; 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-369 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730. 
 99. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683; see also id. 
at 692 (strengthening Rule 11 sanctions to reduce any incentive to file frivolous 
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in the 1930s, the protection of investors was again touted as the 
impetus for legislative action—but this time from lawyers acting 
purportedly on their behalf in filing meritless lawsuits.100  “Investors 
always are the ultimate losers when extortionate ‘settlements’ are 
extracted from issuers.”101 
The PSLRA made significant changes to private causes of action 
under the 1933 Act and, even more significantly, the 1934 Act.  First, 
the PSLRA added a safe-harbor provision to both the 1933 Act and 
1934 Act for “forward-looking statements.”102  Plaintiffs now must 
allege that a defendant made a forward-looking statement with actual 
knowledge of its falsity—even under the “strict liability” provisions of 
the 1933 Act for which no showing of scienter is otherwise required.103 
The PSLRA also contained a number of procedural amendments 
to class actions under both the 1933 Act and 1934 Act.  Securities 
class actions now require the appointment of the “most adequate 
plaintiff,” which is presumed to be the investor with the “largest 
financial interest in the relief sought by the class.”104  This measure 
served to protect the class from its own lawyers, as “courts could be 
more confident settlements negotiated under the supervision of 
institutional plaintiffs were ‘fair and reasonable’ than is the case with 
settlements negotiated by unsupervised plaintiffs’ attorneys.”105 
The PSLRA also mandated a stay of discovery while a motion to 
dismiss is pending—absent the need to preserve evidence or prevent 
undue prejudice—to reduce the costs of meritless actions.106  The 
PSLRA also required stricter application of Rule 11 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure for the imposition of sanctions107 in order to 
“reduce significantly the economic incentive [of plaintiffs’ lawyers] to 
file meritless lawsuits without hindering the ability of the victims of 
fraud to pursue legitimate claims.”108 
Given the focus on abuses in securities fraud litigation, the PSLRA 
also contained amendments unique to fraud claims under the 1934 
Act.  The PSLRA imposed heightened pleading requirements on 
                                                          
lawsuits while allowing victims of fraud to pursue their legitimate claims). 
 100. See id. at 685 (noting that the legislation was designed to encourage the 
pursuit of valid securities fraud claims by plaintiffs’ lawyers and to promote the fight 
of abusive claims by defendants). 
 101. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731. 
 102. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(A), 78u-5(c)(1)(A) (2000). 
 103. Id. §§ 77z-2(b), 78u-5(b). 
 104. Id. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I). 
 105. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690. 
 106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(b), 78u-4(b)(3). 
 107. Id. §§ 77z-1(c)(1), 78u-4(c)(1). 
 108. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 13, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 692. 
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securities fraud claims under the 1934 Act consistent with a 
“stringent” reading of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.109  Specifically, 1934 Act plaintiffs must “specify each 
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why 
the statement is misleading, and if an allegation regarding the 
statement or omission is made on information and belief, the 
complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is 
formed.”110  Plaintiffs must also “state with particularity facts giving 
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required 
state of mind.”111  Where a plaintiff fails to meet either of these 
heightened pleading requirements, a court “shall” grant a motion to 
dismiss the 1934 Act claim.112 
C. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 
The PSLRA did not modify the jurisdictional provisions of the 
federal securities laws, including the non-removal provision of the 
1933 Act.  As a result, plaintiffs’ lawyers—the PSLRA’s main target—
could still file either 1933 Act claims113 or state law claims in state 
court in order to sidestep the new pleading and procedural 
requirements.114  Despite inconclusive evidence as to the actual 
exploitation of this loophole,115 Congress passed SLUSA in order to 
                                                          
 109. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740.  Rule 9(b) requires that “all averments of fraud and 
mistake . . . shall be stated with particularity.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 110. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1). 
 111. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2). 
 112. Id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A). 
 113. As described supra, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction only over 1933 
Act claims, not 1934 Act claims.  Moreover, it is unclear to what extent the PSLRA’s 
procedural requirements apply to 1933 Act claims brought in state court, as many 
apply only to class actions filed “pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”  
Id. §§ 77z-1(a), 78u-4(a); see also Nicholas E. Chimicles, The Future of Securities 
Litigation Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, SA90 ALI-ABA 465, 
477 (1996) (noting that “[t]he [PSLRA]’s procedural changes only apply to cases 
brought in Federal court”).  Compare id. §§ 77z-1(c)(1), 78u-4(c)(1) (requiring court 
findings of compliance “with each requirement of Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure”), with id. §§ 77z-1(b), 78u-4(b)(3) (applying to “any private action 
arising under this subchapter”). 
 114. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 14-15 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that “since 
passage of the [PSLRA], plaintiffs’ lawyers have sought to circumvent the [PSLRA]’s 
provisions by exploiting differences between Federal and State laws by filing frivolous 
and speculative lawsuits in State court, where essentially none of the [PSLRA]’s 
procedural or substantive protections against abusive suits are available”); S. REP. NO. 
105-182, at 1 (1998); see also Perino, supra note 17, at 1046 (noting “a significant shift 
of activity from federal to state court in an apparent attempt by plaintiffs to avoid the 
procedural and substantive hurdles Congress created when it passed the [PSLRA]”). 
 115. Compare Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism:  Preempting Private State 
Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 302 (1998) (finding “a 
significant shift in litigation from federal to state court” despite lack of “attempt[ ] to 
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curb such forum selection and promote national standards for 
securities traded on national exchanges.116 
The target again was the plaintiffs’ bar:  “[W]e are here tonight to 
perfect [the PSLRA], to say you cannot use the State courts to do the 
same illicit, abusive strike suits that you were formerly doing in 
Federal court.”117  Actions “alleging fraud” were again seen as the 
main conduit for abusive litigation.118  Moreover, given that strike 
suits were primarily brought as securities fraud class actions for 
maximum effect, Congress did not change the treatment of 
individual lawsuits.119 
In an attempt to close this jurisdictional loophole, SLUSA added 
Section 77p(c) and 78bb(f) to the 1933 Act and 1934 Act, 
respectively, which provide:  “Any covered class action brought in any 
State court involving a covered security, as set forth in subsection (b) 
of this section, shall be removable to the Federal district court for the 
district in which the action is pending, and shall be subject to 
subsection (b) of this section.”120  In turn, “subsection (b)” provides: 
No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of 
any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or 
Federal court by any private party alleging—(1) an untrue 
statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a covered security; or (2) that the defendant 
used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered 
security.121 
                                                          
quantify pre-[PSLRA] levels of state court activity in order to measure the exact size 
of this shift”), with Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm:  Federal Preemption 
of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 42-45 (1998) (reviewing 
research on statistical data involving state court claims made after passage of the 
PSLRA and noting that the data did not provide strong evidence of filings in state 
court to avoid the PSLRA’s requirements). 
 116. 143 CONG. REC. S10477 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1997) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
 117. 144 CONG. REC. H6058 (daily ed. July 21, 1998) (statement of Rep. Tauzin); 
see also 144 CONG. REC. S12445 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998) (statement of Sen. D’Amato) 
(“[W]e should not condone little more than a judicially sanctioned shakedown that 
only benefits strike lawyers.”); 144 CONG. REC. H6059-60 (daily ed. July 21, 1998) 
(statement of Rep. Cox) (“The stockholders here are being taken advantage of by 
lawyers who bring lawsuits for their own benefit, and that is what the [PSLRA] was all 
about.”); id. at H6063 (statement of Rep. Oxley) (commenting that “shareholders 
and employees lose every time that the company has to pay off a passel of lawyers just 
to settle”). 
 118. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2 
¶ 5, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 119. H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 2; see also S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 6 (noting that 
individual state actions would not be affected by SLUSA). 
 120. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(c), 78bb(f)(2)(2000). 
 121. Id. §§ 77p(b), 78bb(f)(3). 
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SLUSA amended the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act by 
adding the exception “as provided in section 77p(c) of this title.”122  
This amendment is hardly a model of clarity.  Combining the cross-
referenced provisions, the 1933 Act now permits removal of class 
actions based on the statutory or common law of a state involving a 
covered security.123  By the plain language of these provisions, 
Congress appears to have reached the anomalous result of 
authorizing the removal and preemption of state law claims, while 
keeping federal 1933 Act claims in state court. 
The legislative history provides no clear guidance on the 
parameters of SLUSA’s amendment to the non-removal provision of 
the 1933 Act.  The amendment was at least inartfully—or, given the 
repeated statements of intent to the contrary, perhaps mistakenly—
drafted.  For example, despite a slew of references to state versus 
federal courts as the relevant demarcation in the legislative history,124 
the express rationale of SLUSA ended up being “to limit the conduct 
of securities class actions under State law, and for other purposes.”125  
While making federal courts the exclusive forum for all claims 
involving national securities might have been the intent of Congress, 
the end result was another loophole:  this time, permitting the filing 
of 1933 Act claims in state court seeking recovery on the same 
                                                          
 122. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 101(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77v(a). 
 123. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b), 77p(c), 77v(a). 
 124. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 13 (stating that the purpose of SLUSA is to 
prevent plaintiffs from evading federal protections against abusive litigation by filing 
claims in state, rather than federal, court); id. (“Under [SLUSA], class actions 
relating to a ‘covered security’ . . . alleging fraud or manipulation must be 
maintained pursuant to the provisions of Federal securities law, in Federal court 
(subject to certain exceptions).”); H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 8-9 (1998) (same); 144 
CONG. REC. H10779 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998) (statement of Rep. Oxley) (“The 
conference report prevents lawyers from evading the protections of the [PSLRA] by 
filing their lawsuit in State court.”); id. at H10780 (statement of Rep. Eshoo) 
(commenting that SLUSA is intended to “assur[e] that lawsuits involving nationally 
traded securities remain in Federal courts where they have always been heard”); id. at 
H10771 (statement of Rep. Bliley) (“This legislation we are considering today will 
eliminate State court as a venue for meritless securities litigation . . . . The premise of 
this legislation is simple:  lawsuits alleging violations that involve securities that are 
offered nationally belong in Federal court.”); 144 CONG. REC. H6060 (daily ed. July 
21, 1998) (statement of Rep. Cox) (“[T]his legislation will make federal courts the 
exclusive venue for large-scale securities fraud lawsuits . . .”); 143 CONG. REC. S10475 
(daily ed. Oct. 7, 1997) (statement of Sen. Gramm) (“[I]f a stock is traded on the 
national market, . . . then the class-action suit has to be filed in federal court.”).  This 
confusion was also apparently shared by then-SEC Commissioner Arthur Levitt.  See 
144 CONG. REC. S12444-45 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998) (letter from Arthur Levitt to 
Senators D’Amato, Gramm, Dodd) (stating that “the bill generally provides that class 
actions can be brought only in federal court where they will be governed by federal 
law”). 
 125. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Introductory Statement 
(emphasis added). 
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allegations of fraud as 1934 Act claims subject to the heightened 
pleading requirements of the PSLRA. 
D. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
Whereas the latter half of the 1990s was marked by corporate—and 
investor—prosperity, the new millennium commenced with a severe 
downturn in the stock market and the revelation of massive, multi-
billion-dollar corporate frauds.  Congress reacted to fraud scandals 
such as Enron and WorldCom with the swift passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in 2002.  As with the securities legislation in both the 1930s 
and 1990s, fraud was the primary impetus for the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.126  This time, however, the tides of investor 
protection had turned.  The investing public now had to be protected 
not from lawyers filing fraud actions on their behalf (as with the 
PSLRA and SLUSA), but (as with the 1933 Act and 1934 Act) from 
issuers and their directors, officers, and agents committing the frauds 
in the first place.127 
The scope of Congress’s reaction matched that of the frauds being 
targeted, with amendments scattered among many titles of the 
United States Code.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act added a number of new 
disclosure and certification requirements to the regulatory 
framework of the federal securities laws.  Specifically, the chief 
executive and financial officers of the issuer must now certify that 
each periodic report “fully complies with the requirements of section 
13(a) or 15(d) of the [1934 Act] and that information contained in 
the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the 
financial condition and results of operations of the issuer.”128  
Congress added teeth to these disclosure requirements in the form of 
hefty criminal penalties—up to $5,000,000 and 20 years 
                                                          
 126. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2 (2002) (“This bill contains a number of 
provisions intended to increase the criminal penalties for serious fraud, ensure that 
evidence—both physical and testimonial—is preserved and available in fraud cases, 
provide prosecutors with the tools they need to prosecute those who commit 
securities fraud, and make sure that victims of securities fraud have a fair chance to 
pursue their claims and recoup their losses.”); 148 CONG. REC. S6526 (daily ed. July 
10, 2002) (statement of Sen. McConnell) (noting “today’s stories of corporate fraud, 
deception, and outright theft that we all cite as the real motivation behind the 
underlying bill”). 
 127. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2 (“This bill would play a crucial role in restoring 
trust in the financial markets by ensuring that the corporate fraud and greed may be 
better detected, prevented and prosecuted.”); id. at 17 (extending limitations period 
for claims involving fraud as not to “unfairly limit recovery for defrauded investors”). 
 128. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906(a), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350(b) (Supp. II 2002) 
(citation omitted). 
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imprisonment for willful violations.129  Congress also established new 
federal crimes for obstruction of justice130 and securities fraud,131 
increased the penalties for some existing crimes,132 and either 
directed or requested review of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
for other crimes.133 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s focus on fraud is made clear by its only 
reform to private rights of action134—an extended limitations period 
as further protection to victims of fraud.135  The 1933 Act contains an 
express limitations period for Section 11 and 12 claims,136 while the 
Supreme Court transposed the one-year/three-year limitations period 
found elsewhere in the 1934 Act upon the implied rights of action 
under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5.137  Congress heeded the warning 
                                                          
 129. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350(c)(2). 
 130. Id. §§ 1512, 1519, 1520(b). 
 131. See id. §§ 1348, 1349 (codifying crimes of conspiracy and attempt to commit 
securities fraud). 
 132. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a) (West 2002) (criminal violations of the 1934 Act); 18 
U.S.C.A. § 1341 (mail fraud); id. § 1343 (wire fraud); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1131 (West 2002) 
(ERISA).  
 133. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 805 (directing the United States Sentencing 
Commission to review and amend the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for obstruction 
of justice and extensive criminal fraud); id. § 905 (directing review of sentencing 
guidelines relating to certain white-collar offenses); id. § 1104 (requesting review of 
sentencing guidelines for securities and accounting fraud). 
 134. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658(b) (West 2005) (establishing a statute of limitations of 
two years after the discovery of a violation or five years after a violation, whichever is 
earlier).  Given the few protections afforded investors under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
with respect to private rights of action, the Shareholder and Employee Rights 
Restoration Act of 2003 was introduced in the House of Representatives “[t]o repeal 
the provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act that limit private securities actions . . . .”  H.R. 636, 
108th Cong. (2003).  This bill would have repealed SLUSA’s amendment to the non-
removal provision of the 1933 Act.  Id. § 2(c)(2).  However, the last action taken on 
the bill was its reference to the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and 
Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee in March 2003.  See Thomas, 
The Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d108:636:./list 
/bss/d108HR.lst:@@@X|TOM:/bss/108search.html| (last visited Nov. 19, 2005) 
(listing all actions taken on this bill). 
 135. See 148 CONG. REC. S1787 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) 
(arguing “[i]t is time that the law be changed to give victims the time they need to 
prove their fraud cases.”). 
 136. See 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2000) (providing that “[n]o action shall be maintained 
to enforce any liability created under section 77k or 77l(a)(2) of this title unless 
brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, 
or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, or, if the action is to enforce a liability created under section 77l(a)(1) of 
this title, unless brought within one year after the violation upon which it is based.  
In no event shall any such action be brought to enforce a liability created under 
section 77k or 77l(a)(1) of this title more than three years after the security was bona 
fide offered to the public, or under section 77l(a)(2) of this title more than three 
years after the sale.”). 
 137. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 
(1991) (holding that claims under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 are subject to the 
statute of limitations in Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act).  Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act 
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that, while the Court had adopted a limitations period for fraud 
claims from strict liability provisions of the 1934 Act, “[t]he most 
extensive and corrupt schemes may not be discovered within the time 
allowed for bringing an express cause of action under the 1934 
Act.”138 
Entitled “Statute of Limitations for Securities Fraud,” Section 804 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act created a new express limitations period 
applicable not to claims under any particular statute, but to any 
“private right of action that involves a claim of fraud . . . concerning 
the securities laws.”139  Such claims “may be brought not later than the 
earlier of—(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the 
violation; or (2) 5 years after such violation.”140  Congress did not add 
this new limitations provision to the 1933 Act or 1934 Act, or 
elsewhere under Title 15, but to the catch-all limitations period for 
federal statutes under Title 28.141  That statutory placement suggests 
that Congress intended to protect plaintiffs of a certain substantive 
type (i.e., fraud victims), rather than plaintiffs asserting claims under 
any particular statutory provision. 
Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is riddled with ambiguity.142  
First, there is no indication how this provision interrelates with (i.e., 
supersedes) any of the express limitations provisions elsewhere in the 
1933 Act and 1934 Act.143  Moreover, Section 804 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act provides no definition of the term “private right of action 
that involves a claim of fraud” and makes no reference to any 
particular federal statutes under which such private right of action 
may arise.144  Regardless, courts thus far have agreed that this 
                                                          
provides:  “No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this 
section, unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting 
the violation and within three years after such violation.”  15 U.S.C. § 78(i)(e). 
 138. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 377 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 139. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658(b) (West 2005).  The term “securities laws” includes both 
the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(47).  Id.  
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. § 1658 (providing for “[t]ime limitations on the commencement of 
civil actions arising under Acts of Congress”). 
 142. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act—Section 804 in particular—has been widely 
criticized for being hastily and poorly drafted.  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., A Brief 
Tour of the Major Reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SH097 ALI-ABA 151, 171-72 (2002) 
(arguing that because the Act was passed quickly and many of the important 
provisions were added by floor amendments and without hearings, it is not surprising 
that it contains ambiguities and  has had some unintended consequences). 
 143. See Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath:  Some Reflections on the 
Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 693 (2002) 
(arguing that Section 804 is “poorly drafted” for being “inconsistent with express 
statutes of limitation already contained in the federal securities laws and is likely to 
create significant interpretational difficulties for courts”). 
 144. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658(b). 
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extended limitations period applies to Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 
claims.145  No court has yet found this extended limitations period 
applicable to 1933 Act claims.146  However, this unanimity is 
misleading given that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been interpreted 
only with respect to 1933 Act claims of a certain nature.147 
E. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
Class action litigation reform had been simmering in Congress in 
recent years,148 culminating in the recent enactment of CAFA in 
February 2005.149  As it had recently attempted to achieve in the 
securities arena with SLUSA, Congress targeted forum shopping in 
the filing of class action lawsuits of all substantive sorts in state 
courts.150  Congress found it particularly troubling that “certain 
favored judges” in state courts were “hearing nationwide cases and 
setting policy for the entire country,”151 with “an almost ‘anything 
goes’ approach that remedies virtually any controversy subject to 
certification as a class action.”152 
Like SLUSA, CAFA handicaps plaintiffs because of the 
jurisdictional tactics of their lawyers.153  One noted maneuver was 
                                                          
 145. See, e.g., In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 365 
n.16 (D. Md. 2004) (noting that Section 804 “applies to claims which are 
fraud-based, such as § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims”); Nw. Human Servs., Inc. v. 
Panaccio, No. Civ.A. 03-157, 2004 WL 2166293, at *18 n.72 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2004) 
(stating that “[s]ection 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 extended section 
10(b)’s statute of limitations and repose from the one-year/three-year period 
outlined in Lampf to a two-year/five-year period”). 
 146. See infra note 321 and accompanying text. 
 147. See infra note 322 and accompanying text (noting that these holdings only 
pertain to claims that do not allege fraud). 
 148. See H.R. 3789, 105th Cong. (1998) (introducing the Class Action Jurisdiction 
Act of 1998).  The Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1998 sought class action reform of 
the sort eventually enacted in the form of CAFA.  Similar reforms were reintroduced 
multiple times in subsequent sessions of Congress.  See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 106-320 
(1999) (proposing the Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999); S. REP. No. 
106-420 (2000) (introducing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2000); S. REP. No. 108-
123 (2003) (discussing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2003). 
 149. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.). 
 150. See 151 CONG. REC. S1076 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Specter) 
(explaining that “[t]he class action bill has as its central focus to prevent judge 
shopping to various States and even counties where courts and judges have a 
prejudicial predisposition on cases.”); id. at S1081 (statement of Sen. Lott) 
(addressing “a dramatic rise in the number of interstate class actions being filed in 
State courts, particularly in what are called magnet jurisdictions”); 151 CONG. REC. 
H748 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. Blunt) (arguing that “[l]awyers 
who now manipulate this system often do anything to stay out of Federal court”). 
 151. 151 CONG. REC. H726 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. 
Sensenbrenner). 
 152. Id. at H727 (statement of Rep. Boucher). 
 153. See id. at H726 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (targeting “aggressive 
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preventing removal of class actions by bringing only state law claims 
and artfully pleading around the requirements for diversity 
jurisdiction.154  That is, plaintiffs’ lawyers would name parties of 
certain state citizenship to destroy complete diversity and/or seek less 
than the requisite amount-in-controversy for any one plaintiff in 
order to remain in state court.155 
Accordingly, CAFA expanded diversity jurisdiction—the original 
tool against local favoritism in state courts—over class actions.156  
Echoing SLUSA, the goal was to allow class actions of a “truly 
national” nature to be heard in federal court.157  Congress extended 
CAFA to “mass actions”158 which class action lawyers might have 
otherwise filed to sidestep the new jurisdictional provisions.159  
                                                          
forum shopping by trial lawyers to find courts and judges who will act as willing 
accomplices in a judicial power grab”); id. at H729 (statement of Rep. 
Sensenbrenner) (stating that legislative action is an “attempt to put an end to the 
type of gaming engaged in by plaintiffs’ lawyers to keep cases in state court”); id. at 
H735 (statement of Rep. Keller) (noting that “crafty lawyers are able to game the 
system by filing large, nationwide class action suits in certain preferred State courts”); 
151 CONG. REC. S1084 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Cornyn) (noting 
class action abuses by “a handful of aggressive personal injury lawyers to pursue 
abusive litigation and junk lawsuits”). 
 154. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000) (providing that federal courts have 
jurisdiction over suits between parties of diverse citizenship with in excess of $75,000 
in controversy). 
 155. See 151 CONG. REC. S1079 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Dodd) 
(“[P]laintiffs’ lawyers have been able to keep class actions out of Federal court, even 
those that are precisely the kind of cases for which diversity jurisdiction was created, 
because of their interstate character.  They do this by adding named plaintiffs or 
defendants solely based on their State of citizenship in order to defeat the diversity 
requirement.  Alternatively, they allege an amount in controversy that does not 
trigger the $75,000 threshold for removing cases to Federal court.  The result is 
frequently an absurd one.  A slip-and-fall case in which a plaintiff alleges, say, $76,000 
in damages can end up in Federal court.  At the same time, a case involving millions 
of plaintiffs from multiple States and billions of dollars in alleged damages is heard 
in State court, just because no plaintiff claims more than $75,000 in damages or 
because at least one defendant is from the same State of at least one plaintiff.”). 
 156. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 2(b)(2) (providing that the purpose of 
CAFA is to “restore the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution by 
providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance 
under diversity jurisdiction”). 
 157. 151 CONG. REC. S1077 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. McConnell) 
(noting that legislation would still allow local controversies to be heard in state 
courts). 
 158. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 4(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (defining a “mass action” for purposes of CAFA as “any civil 
action . . . in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be 
tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of 
law or fact,” as long as such joinder is not proposed by defendants or solely for 
purposes of pretrial proceedings). 
 159. See id. § 1332(d)(11)(A) (providing that “a mass action shall be deemed to be 
a [removable] class action”); see also 151 CONG. REC. S1082 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) 
(statement of Sen. Lott) (explaining that the mass action provision “will ensure that 
class action-like cases are covered by the bill’s jurisdictional provisions even if the 
cases are not pleaded as class actions”); 151 CONG. REC. H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 
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Indeed, Congress had adopted a similar loophole-closing measure in 
SLUSA in defining “covered class actions” to cover more than 
traditional class actions.160 
As a result, federal courts now have diversity jurisdiction over a 
class action or mass action if the amount in controversy alleged by all 
plaintiffs collectively exceeds $5,000,000 and any member of the 
plaintiff class is a citizen of a foreign state or a different state from 
any defendant.161  However, to allow “primarily intrastate actions that 
lack national implications” to remain in state court,162 CAFA exempts 
from this jurisdictional reach cases in which at least two-thirds of the 
plaintiff class and primary defendants are citizens of the state in 
which the action is filed.163 
In addition, CAFA accords federal courts the discretion to decline 
jurisdiction “in the interests of justice” where the local or national 
nature of the case is less obvious.164  Specifically, if greater than one-
third but fewer than two-thirds of the plaintiff class and primary 
defendants are citizens of the state in which the action is filed, the 
federal court may decline to exercise jurisdiction based on six factors:  
(1) whether the suit presents issues of significant national or 
interstate interest; (2) whether the claims will be governed by laws 
other than those of the forum state; (3) whether the case has been 
pleaded so as to avoid federal jurisdiction; (4) whether there is a 
“distinct” nexus between the state forum and the plaintiff class, the 
alleged harm, or the defendants; (5) whether the citizenship of the 
members of the proposed plaintiff class is widely dispersed among 
states and higher in the forum state than any other single state; and 
(6) whether other similar class actions have been recently filed to 
allow for coordination of parallel actions.165  This last factor is to be 
                                                          
2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (characterizing “mass actions” as “class 
actions in disguise . . . result[ing] in the same abuses as class actions”); id. at H729 
(statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (noting that a mass action “will be treated as a 
class action for jurisdictional purposes”). 
 160. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 101(a)(1), (b)(1), 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77p(f)(2)(A)(ii), 78bb(f)(5)(B)(ii) (2000) (defining “covered class 
actions” as not only actions brought on behalf of a plaintiff class, but also “any group 
of lawsuits filed in or pending in the same court and involving common questions of 
law or fact, in which—(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons; 
and (II) the lawsuits are joined, consolidated, or otherwise proceed as a single action 
for any purpose”). 
 161. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2). 
 162. 151 CONG. REC. S1079 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
 163. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(4)(B). 
 164. Id. § 1332(d)(3). 
 165. Id. 
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broadly interpreted so that plaintiffs cannot “plead around it with 
creative legal theories” to avoid jurisdiction.166 
Securities class actions are expressly addressed in CAFA—but only 
to be exempted therefrom.167  The massive corporate frauds 
underpinning the Sarbanes-Oxley Act were often invoked by 
opponents to CAFA as evidence that plaintiffs needed more—or at 
least not less—protection in the class action context.168  This was met 
with reassurance from CAFA’s proponents that securities fraud was 
expressly exempted from the legislation.169 
Notably, however, this carve-out for securities class actions was part 
of the original class action reform proposals predating the stock 
market downturn in 2000 and the massive frauds of the likes of 
Enron and WorldCom.170  Therefore, the purpose of the securities 
exception in CAFA appears not primarily to have been for the 
protection of investors from securities fraud.  Rather, its intent was to 
preserve the “carefully crafted” jurisdictional framework over 
securities claims established in SLUSA.171  Indeed, the desire to 
                                                          
 166. 151 CONG. REC. H728 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. 
Sensenbrenner). 
 167. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(9)(A) (providing that Section 1331(d)(2) “shall 
not apply to any class action that solely involves a claim concerning a covered security 
as defined under section 16(f)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 and section 
28(f)(5)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934”) (citation omitted); id. § 
1453(d)(1) (providing that Section 1453 “shall not apply to any class action that 
solely involves a claim concerning a covered security as defined under section 
16(f)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 and section 28(f)(5)(E) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934”); see also S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 29 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 28 (noting that the legislation “excludes from its federal jurisdiction 
grant . . . any securities class actions covered by [SLUSA]”). 
 168. See 151 CONG. REC. H727 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Rep. Conyers) 
(arguing that “[i]f we have learned anything from the Enron, Tyco, Firestone, and 
other legal debacles, it is that our citizens need more protection against wrongdoers 
in our society, not less”); 151 CONG. REC. H742 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement 
of Rep. Meehan) (arguing against CAFA by reference to “corporate crooks at Enron, 
WorldCom, and other companies” and “unscrupulous mutual fund managers”); id. 
(statement of Rep. Stark) (warning that “the accountability of companies like Eron 
[sic] would be held less accountable”); id. at H748 (statement of Rep. Pelosi) 
(cautioning that CAFA “would help shield large corporations from any accountability 
for Enron-style shareholder fraud”). 
 169. See 149 CONG. REC. H5282 (daily ed. June 12, 2003) (statement of Rep. 
Sensenbrenner) (noting that draft legislation “specifically excludes a number of 
Federal securities and State-based corporate fraud lawsuits”); 148 CONG. REC. H840 
(daily ed. Mar. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep. Pryce) (stating that “[t]his has nothing 
to do with Enron. . . . [S]ecurities litigation is carved out entirely by this legislation.  
It would not cover Enron”). 
 170. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 106-320, at 3 (1999) (providing that the Interstate 
Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999 “shall not apply to any claim concerning a 
covered security as that term is defined in [the 1933 Act and 1934 Act]”). 
 171. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 50 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 46-47; see 
also 151 CONG. REC. H729 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. 
Sensenbrenner) (noting that “[t]he purpose of this provision is to avoid disturbing 
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preserve this “framework” was reiterated throughout the class action 
bill’s history up through its enactment in the form of CAFA in 2005.172 
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE AMENDED                                              
NON-REMOVAL PROVISION 
In this set of legislation over the past decade, Congress has reset 
the balance between federal and state jurisdiction to address 
“windfall settlements for trial attorneys, forum shopping, and the 
need for more of these large interstate class actions cases to be in 
Federal court.”173  In the securities context, Congress made express 
amendments to removal jurisdiction in SLUSA in order to create 
national standards for securities class actions,174 and expressly opted 
not to disrupt its “carefully crafted” framework when drafting 
CAFA.175  Although Congress appears certain of the fruits of its 
efforts, its amendment to the non-removal provision in SLUSA has in 
fact wreaked havoc on this “framework.” 
Federal courts have been sharply divided in interpreting just how 
SLUSA amended the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act.  By its 
plain language, SLUSA did not completely close the loophole 
originally opened by the PSLRA with respect to either class or 
individual actions.  In terms of class actions, some courts have 
remanded 1933 Act claims to state court based on their reading of 
SLUSA as amending the express prohibition on removal only as to 
class actions “based upon the statutory or common law of any 
State . . . .”176  Other courts have denied motions to remand 1933 Act 
class actions to state court “[b]ased on the language of the statute 
and the congressional findings in SLUSA.”177 
                                                          
in any way the Federal vs. State court jurisdictional lines already drawn in the 
securities litigation class action context by the enactment of [SLUSA]”). 
 172. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 50, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 46-47; S. REP. 
NO. 108-123, at 22 (2003) (noting that CAFA will not affect the jurisdictional lines 
already established for securities class actions by SLUSA); S. REP. NO. 106-420, at 34 
(2000) (same); H.R. REP. NO. 106-320, at 22 (1999) (noting that “[t]he Committee 
recognizes that Congress has previously enacted legislation governing the 
adjudication of these claims [the PSLRA and SLUSA] . . . . So as not to disturb the 
carefully crafted framework for litigating in this context, claims involving covered 
securities are not included in the new section 1332(b) jurisdiction”) (citations 
omitted). 
 173. 151 CONG. REC. H746 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. 
Sensenbrenner); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 13 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (noting 
that SLUSA is intended “to prevent plaintiffs from seeking to evade the protections 
that Federal law provides against abusive litigation by filing suit in State, rather than 
in Federal, court”). 
 174. H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 2. 
 175. See supra notes 171-172. 
 176. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2000).  See infra notes 185-91 and accompanying text. 
 177. Alkow v. TXU Corp., Nos. 3:02-CV-2738-K, 3:02-CV-2739-K, 2003 WL 
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In terms of individual actions, SLUSA was intended not to change 
their treatment for purposes of jurisdiction178—and accordingly more 
conspicuously left open the possibility that they could still be filed in 
state court.  Taking this safer route, or perhaps as a result of their 
own misreading of the convoluted statutory language, some plaintiffs’ 
lawyers have filed individual 1933 Act claims in state court against the 
same defendants on the same essential allegations of fraud as many 
actions filed and consolidated in federal court.179 
This well-orchestrated strategy has been brought into the spotlight 
by the filing of a large number of individual claims in state courts 
across the country in connection with the largest corporate frauds in 
history, with real consequences on the administration of parallel 
federal litigation.  In response, the federal courts handling the 
consolidated actions have invoked various sources of judicial 
authority to try to effectuate Congress’s stated—yet otherwise 
unrealized—goals to combat forum shopping.180  These efforts have 
had mixed success, either ending in reversal or resting on shaky legal 
grounds in defiance of fundamental principles regarding the 
interpretation of federal removal statutes.181 
Courts have had to grapple not only with the plain meaning of 
SLUSA’s amendment to the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act 
with respect to class actions, but also the practical effects of its 
loopholes with respect to individual actions as exacerbated in 
litigation stemming from large-scale corporate frauds.  With judicial 
discord on both fronts, this “carefully crafted framework” in fact 
appears to be in need of further crafting to close the remaining 
loopholes existing both in theory and practice. 
A. Class Actions 
As discussed earlier, SLUSA amended the non-removal provision of 
the 1933 Act to read as follows:  “Except as provided in section 77p(c) of 
this title, no case arising under this subchapter and brought in any 
State court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of 
the United States.”182  Section 77p(c) permits the removal of “[a]ny 
covered class action brought in any State court involving a covered 
security, as set forth in subsection (b) of this section,” which in turn 
                                                          
21056750, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 8, 2003).  See infra notes 192-200 and accompanying 
text. 
 178. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 179. See infra notes 220-222 and accompanying text. 
 180. See infra Part II.B. 
 181. See infra Part II.B. 
 182. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2000) (emphasis added to reflect amendment). 
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implicates only class actions “based upon the statutory or common 
law of any State or subdivision thereof.”183  Accordingly, the plain 
language of the non-removal provision, as amended, indicates that 
class actions based on federal law fall outside the purview of Section 
77p(c).184 
Only a handful of courts have directly interpreted SLUSA’s effect 
on the removability of class actions under the 1933 Act.  The majority 
of those courts have adopted this plain reading of the statute in 
remanding 1933 Act class actions to state court.185  Despite 
recognizing contrary signals in the legislative history,186 courts have 
not seen fit to modify the statute to coincide with Congress’s intent 
where the language is clear, and where removal statutes require strict 
construction.187  These courts even find some support for this strict 
                                                          
 183. Id. §§ 77p(b), (c). 
 184. Numerous courts have implicitly recognized this plain language reading in 
dicta.  See, e.g., Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 
2005) (noting that SLUSA “creates an express exception to the well-pleaded 
complaint rule, conferring federal removal jurisdiction over a unique class of state 
law claims”); Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 33 
(2d Cir. 2005) (directing that “the action must be based on state or local law” to be 
removable under SLUSA), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 34 (2005); Popp Telecom, Inc. v. 
Am. Sharecom, Inc., 361 F.3d 482, 488 (8th Cir. 2004) (explaining that SLUSA 
“provides for removal to federal court and dismissal of certain class actions brought 
under state law”); Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 
1342 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating that “in order to remove an action to federal court 
under SLUSA, the removing party must show [inter alia] that . . . the plaintiffs’ 
claims are based on state law”). 
 185. See, e.g., Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. 04 C 4909, 04 C 7096, 2005 
WL 1272271, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2005) (remanding a case containing only 
Section 11 claim because statutory language unambiguously limits removal to 
“certain class actions containing state law claims”); Zia v. Medical Staffing Network, 
Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (remanding a case comprising only 
1933 Act claims because removal requires plaintiff’s claims to be based in state law); 
In re Tyco Int’l, Ltd., 322 F. Supp. 2d 116, 121 (D.N.H. 2004) (finding that SLUSA’s 
text and legislative history do not support removal of 1933 Act claims under Section 
77p(c)); Haw. Structural Ironworkers Pension Trust Fund v. Calpine Corp., No. 
03CV0714BTM, 2003 WL 23509312, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2003) (holding that 
“the plain language of section 77p(c) limits removal to class actions that are based 
upon state claims.”); Nauheim v. Interpublic Group of Cos., No. 02-C-9211, 2003 WL 
1888843, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2003) (deciding that the 1933 Act clearly permits 
the removal of only class actions based on state law); Martin v. Bellsouth Corp., No. 
03-CV-728-WBH, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Ga. July 7, 2003) (remanding 1933 Act claim 
based on SLUSA’s plain language despite express legislative intent to prevent 
plaintiffs from abusively litigating by filing in state court); In re Waste Mgmt. Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d 590, 593 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (concluding that SLUSA’s 
amendment to the non-removal provision only applies to class actions asserting state 
statutory or common law claims and not to those based solely on federal law like the 
1933 Act). 
 186. See Haw. Structural Ironworkers, 2003 WL 23509312, at *2;  In re Tyco Int’l, 
Ltd., 322 F. Supp. 2d at 121 n.9. 
 187. Haw. Structural Ironworkers, 2003 WL 23509312, at *2; Martin, slip op. at 5; In 
re Waste Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 592 (stating that removal statutes 
should be strictly construed to preclude removal to federal court). 
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construction in the legislative history, as the stated purpose of SLUSA 
ended up being “to limit the conduct of securities class actions under 
State law.”188  Moreover, the removal provisions in SLUSA were 
precisely drawn, and no express statement was made by Congress 
modifying the traditional rule prohibiting the removal of cases 
brought under the 1933 Act.189  “Congress could have easily made a 
statement in SLUSA expressly modifying this provision had it so 
intended.”190  Rather, the plain language of the statute closes only the 
loophole created by state law claims, not all claims filed in state 
court.191 
Other courts have reached the opposite conclusion by effectively 
rewriting the SLUSA amendment in light of the broader intent 
expressed throughout its legislative history.192  While legislative history 
is typically ignored where the relevant statute is unambiguous,193 it 
may be considered where there is a clearly expressed contrary 
legislative intent that would warrant a different construction of the 
statute.194  It is on this basis that, despite the plain meaning of the 
statute, these courts have sought to correct the “inartfully (or even 
inaccurately) worded” provision of SLUSA in light of various 
conflicting passages in its legislative history.195  One such passage is 
                                                          
 188. Nauheim, 2003 WL 1888843, at *5 (quoting Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998 § 2). 
 189. See In re Waste Mgmt. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 596.  
 190. Id. 
 191. See In re Tyco Int’l, Ltd., 322 F. Supp. 2d at 120 (noting SLUSA was designed 
to address state law claims rather than claims under the 1933 Act). 
 192. See Lowinger v. Johnston, No. 3:05CV316-H, 2005 WL 2592229, at *4 
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 13, 2005) (holding that the removal of 1933 Act claims from state 
court was consistent with Congress’s intent); In re King Pharms., Inc., No. 2:03-CV-77, 
slip op. at 4 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 6, 2004) (determining that legislative history supports 
the removal of state class actions asserting claims exclusively under the 1933 Act to 
federal court); Kulinski v. Am. Elec. Power Co., No. Civ.A.C-2-03-412, 2003 WL 
24032299, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2003) (noting that “covered class actions” are 
“clearly” removable to federal court); Alkow v. TXU Corp., Nos. 3:02-CV-2738-K, 
3:02-CV-2739-K, 2003 WL 21056750, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 8, 2003) (stating that 
Congress intended SLUSA to prevent tactics employed by plaintiffs to avoid federal 
court); Brody v. Homestore, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2003) 
(concluding that class actions brought under the 1933 Act are removable). 
 193. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 
687, 730 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that legislative history can be used 
only to clarify, not contradict, an unambiguous statutory text). 
 194. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177 (1993); see Griffin v. Oceanic 
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) (stating that statutory interpretations 
leading to absurd results should be avoided if an alternative interpretation is 
consistent with the stated legislative purpose). 
 195. Brody, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 1123.  Numerous courts and commentators have 
simply assumed that SLUSA renders all 1933 Act claims removable without analysis.  
See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 98-101 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (noting that in addition to state law claims, 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) removes 
class actions filed in state court from the purview of the non-removal provision), cert. 
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the expressed intent to end the shift to state courts by “enact[ing] 
national standards for securities class action lawsuits involving 
nationally traded securities.”196  If lawsuits involving nationally traded 
securities belong in federal court, and if state law claims are 
removable to federal court under SLUSA, then federal law claims 
under the 1933 Act logically must belong in federal court as well.197  
“[T]hat SLUSA meant to authorize removal of only securities 
litigation brought pursuant to state law is simply irreconcilable with 
these findings.”198  Otherwise, “SLUSA did not counteract the shift in 
cases to state courts that Congress determined had frustrated the 
intent of PSLRA.”199 
Some courts and commentators argue one step further that, “[i]f 
§ 77p(c) applies only to state law claims,” SLUSA’s amendment to the 
non-removal provision would be meaningless because no claim under 
the 1933 Act would be removable.200  However, these commentaries 
overlook the fact that the non-removal provision prevents removal of 
                                                          
denied, 543 U.S. 1080 (2005); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308, 327 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that Sections 16 and 22 of the 1933 Act make federal court 
the forum for class actions involving covered securities with few limited exceptions); 
David M. Brodsky, Private Actions and Private Rights:  Current Hot Trends in Securities 
Litigation, in 1151 CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE HANDBOOK SERIES:  31ST ANNUAL 
INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 773, 806 (Practicing Law Institute 1999) 
(commenting that SLUSA prevents 1933 Act actions from being heard in state 
court); Painter, supra note 115, at 2-3 (noting that SLUSA prevents “class actions in 
state court or under state law”) (emphasis added). 
 196. Kulinski, 2003 WL 24032299, at *4 (quoting Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)). 
 197. See id. (quoting 144 CONG. REC. H11020 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1998) (statement 
of Rep. Bliley)); see also Lowinger, 2005 WL 2592229, at *4 (finding that “removal of 
class actions consisting of 1933 Act claims is consistent with Congress’ express 
intention ‘to make Federal court the exclusive venue for securities fraud class action 
litigation’”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 10 (1998))); Brody, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 
1124 (emphasizing that “[t]he purpose of this title is to prevent plaintiffs from 
seeking to evade the protections the Federal law provides against abusive litigation by 
filing suit in State, rather than in Federal, court” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 
13 (1998) (Conf. Rep.))); H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 8-9 (1998) (determining that 
class actions relating to a “covered security” alleging fraud must be maintained in 
federal court pursuant to federal securities law). 
 198. Brody, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 1124; see also In re King Pharms., Inc., No. 2:03-CV-
77, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 6, 2004) (holding that the legislative history and 
common sense allow the removal of 1933 Act class actions filed in state court). 
 199. Alkow v. TXU Corp., Nos. 3:02-CV-2738-K, 3:02-CV-2739-K, 2003 WL 
21056750, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 8, 2003). 
 200. Id. at *1; see also Brody, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 (agreeing that plaintiff’s 
interpretation of Section 77p(b)-(c) would defeat the purpose of the amendment to 
Section 77v(a)); Andrew J. Morris & Fatima A. Goss, Why Claims Under the Securities Act 
of 1933 Are Removable to Federal Court, 36 Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 626 
(Apr. 5, 2004) (claiming that the exception must extend beyond state-law claims, 
otherwise SLUSA’s amendment to the non-removal provision would be 
meaningless). 
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both claims and cases arising under the 1933 Act.201  For example, a 
state law claim filed conjunctively with 1933 Act claims may fall within 
such a case.202  Even state law claims alone may “arise under” federal 
law for purposes of removal if the complaint establishes a right to 
relief under state law which has a question of federal law in dispute.203  
As a result, the plain language of the amendment to the non-removal 
provision does have meaning because a case may “arise under” the 
1933 Act but still be based on state law.  However, SLUSA’s 
amendment to the non-removal provision would then have the 
limited—and convoluted—purpose of allowing removal of only state 
law claims that turn on the 1933 Act.204  It is doubtful that Congress 
intended this anomalous result without any mention of its distinct 
and narrow contours anywhere in the legislative history. 
Some commentators also offer an alternative reading of the plain 
language of SLUSA to subject 1933 Act claims to removal without 
resorting to legislative history.205  Their analysis is based on the 
placement of the phrase “as set forth in subsection (b)” in Section 
77p(c)—saying that it modifies the immediately preceding term 
“covered security” as opposed to “covered class action.”206  Under that 
reading of the statute, whereas the term “covered class action” is 
modified by the phrase “based upon the statutory or common law of 
any State” in Section 77p(b), the term “covered security” is not.  If 
the phrase “as set forth in subsection (b)” in Section 77p(c) modifies 
only the term “covered security,” “covered class actions” would be 
removable to federal court whether based on state or federal law. 
However, this reading of the statute is invalidated by the operation 
of other provisions of SLUSA.  If class actions under federal law were 
removable under Section 77p(c), they must also “be subject to 
subsection (b),”207 by which they could not subsequently “be 
                                                          
 201. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2000). 
 202. See In re Tyco Int’l, Ltd., 322 F. Supp. 2d 116, 120 (D.N.H. 2004) 
(determining that any case which contains a 1933 Act claim arises under the 1933 
Act even in the presence of state law claims that might be a basis for removal). 
 203. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983). 
 204. Id. at 9. 
 205. See Jordan A. Costa, Removal of Securities Act of 1933 Claims After SLUSA:  What 
Congress Changed, and What It Left Alone, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1193, 1217 (2005) 
(arguing that 1933 Act claims filed in conjunction with state law claims in a state 
court are removable under SLUSA); Morris & Goss, supra note 200, at 626 (noting 
that all 1933 Act claims are removable based on plain language of SLUSA’s 
amendment). 
 206. Morris & Goss, supra note 200, at 625-26. 
 207. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2000) (stating that “[a]ny covered class action brought in 
any State court involving a covered security, as set forth in subsection (b), shall be 
removable to the Federal district court for the district in which the action is pending, 
and shall be subject to subsection (b)”) (emphasis added); see Costa, supra note 205, at 
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maintained in any State or Federal court by any private party.”208  In 
other words, class actions removable under SLUSA are preempted by 
federal law.209  Yet it is nonsensical for federal claims to be preempted 
by federal law.210  Nor is there any hint that Congress intended to alter 
the scope of available 1933 Act claims.  Perhaps in focusing on 
preemption (limited to state law claims), Congress overlooked the 
nuance that SLUSA would thus not provide for the removal of 
otherwise non-removable federal law claims under the 1933 Act. 
This wide disparity in judicial and academic interpretation mirrors 
the fissure between the statutory language and legislative history as to 
how SLUSA applies to 1933 Act claims.  SLUSA itself contains the 
ambiguously expressed intent “to prevent certain State private 
securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to 
frustrate the objectives of the [PSLRA].”211  But are the referenced 
“State” suits those filed in state court, or just those based on state law?  
The legislative history strongly suggests the former, as members of 
Congress repeated time and again their intent to stop the shift from 
federal court to state court and to create national standards for cases 
of national interest.212  However, the plain language of SLUSA’s 
amendment to the non-removal provision provides only for the 
latter—that is, removing class actions based on state law to federal 
court while illogically allowing class actions based on federal law (i.e., 
the 1933 Act) to remain in state court.  Naturally, while some courts 
faithfully adopt the plain language of the statute, others have seen fit 
to “correct” it to effectuate what Congress had repeatedly expressed 
as its overriding goals. 
B. Individual Actions 
SLUSA focused on the shift of class action suits from federal to 
state court in the wake of the PSLRA.  As the discussion above makes 
clear, a non-obvious loophole remains for class actions under the 
                                                          
1217 (proposing removal of 1933 Act claims despite acknowledging that a case, to be 
removable, must be a covered class action, involve a covered security and be subject 
to Section 77p(b)). 
 208. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b). 
 209. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 962-
63 (9th Cir. 2004) (characterizing SLUSA as a “federal statute that preempts state-law 
securities actions”). 
 210. See Morris & Goss, supra note 200, at 626 (acknowledging that Section 77p(b) 
should be limited to state law claims, because only they can be preempted, but 
ignoring that all removable actions under Section 77p(c) must also be subject to 
Section 77p(b)). 
 211. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 2, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 
112 Stat. 3227 (codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 212. See supra notes 116-117, 124-125 and accompanying text. 
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1933 Act.  What is more obvious is that, in applying only to class 
actions, SLUSA expressly did not alter the treatment of individual 
suits.213  Just as the PSLRA ignited a flight to state court for class 
actions, SLUSA has done the same for individual actions under both 
state law and the 1933 Act. 
Although data on state court filings are not readily available,214 
plaintiffs’ lawyers have brought practical meaning to this loophole by 
orchestrating a series of individual 1933 Act claims in state court in a 
very high-profile setting—the massive corporate frauds of the likes of 
Enron and WorldCom.  Congress has not further amended the non-
removal provision of the 1933 Act in reaction to this development.215  
Citing the rubric that “under the securities laws, federal jurisdiction is 
increasingly favored,”216 courts have sought to close the more obvious 
loophole for individual 1933 Act claims despite the fact that the non-
removal provision remains absolute with respect to such claims.  The 
means utilized to achieve that end, however, have been questionable 
at best.  Not surprisingly, this judicial effort has unfolded primarily in 
the wake of one of the largest corporate frauds and bankruptcies in 
United States history: the collapse of WorldCom. 
In June 2002, WorldCom announced that it had improperly 
accounted for almost $4 billion in costs, and soon thereafter filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy.217  Numerous securities fraud class actions—
including at least twenty in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York alone—were filed in federal court 
across the country against WorldCom and its officers, directors, 
underwriters, accountants, and research analysts.218  In October 2002, 
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated thirty-nine 
nationwide class actions, along with those individual actions filed in 
or removed to federal court, before Judge Denise Cote in the 
Southern District of New York.219 
                                                          
 213. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 2. 
 214. See, e.g., Perino, supra note 115, at 302 (noting the lack of data on state class 
actions). 
 215. To the contrary, Congress expressly exempted the federal securities laws 
from CAFA to preserve the jurisdictional standards established in SLUSA.  See supra 
notes 167-172 and accompanying text. 
 216. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 217. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 
2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1080 (2005).  WorldCom later restated its earnings for 
2000 and 2001 by approximately $76 billion.  In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 352 F. 
Supp. 2d 472, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 218. See Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 91. 
 219. In re WorldCom, Inc., Sec. & “ERISA” Litig., 226 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 
2002).  The consolidated class actions had been filed in the Southern District of New 
York, the Southern District of Mississippi, the Southern District of Florida, the 
Northern District of California, and the District of the District of Columbia.  Id. at 
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While many class actions were predictably filed in federal court 
under the mandates of the PSLRA and SLUSA, some plaintiffs’ 
lawyers exploited the jurisdictional uncertainties stemming from that 
legislation by filing individual actions asserting only 1933 Act claims 
in state court.  These parallel state actions arose from the underlying 
financial frauds that were the basis of the federal actions.220  These 
individual actions were not filed in individual fashion.  One law firm, 
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, filed at least forty-seven 
individual actions on behalf of over 120 plaintiffs in at least eight 
states asserting claims exclusively under the 1933 Act.221  Milberg 
Weiss even carefully selected its individual plaintiffs—“a coalition of 
public and private pension funds with $2 to $3 billion in losses” in 
WorldCom securities.222 
The non-removal provision of the 1933 Act was the undisputed 
catalyst for this litigation strategy.223  Milberg Weiss encouraged large 
institutional investors to file individual actions instead of 
participating in class actions,224 and to coordinate litigation in state 
courts across the country apart from any class action suits in federal 
court.225 
Judge Cote did not take kindly to this “de facto class action”226 
being waged in state courts, and invoked a new judicial tool for each 
type of threat to the consolidated federal actions.  First, Judge Cote 
granted relief to the lead plaintiff in the MDL litigation in 
connection with Milberg Weiss’s letter campaign to prospective 
plaintiffs for individual state court actions.227  Judge Cote found that 
these letters did not present “a forthright description of the 
advantages and disadvantages of both the individual action and class 
                                                          
1352. 
 220. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 315 F. Supp. 2d 527, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 221. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 91. 
 222. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ.3288, 2003 WL 22701241, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2003). 
 223. See id. at *5 n.1 (noting Milberg Weiss’s strategy to file numerous claims in 
different states and to resist removal of any cases to federal court by “eschew[ing] the 
filing of [1934] Act claims even if such claims would increase a plaintiff’s leverage, 
since the presence of [1934] Act claims would provide an independent basis for 
removal of the cases to federal court”); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308, 
315 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (describing litigation strategy of Milberg Weiss). 
 224. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 22701241, at *6. 
 225. Id. at *4.  Milberg Weiss itself attested that it would conduct the individual 
actions in a “coordinated cooperative manner so as to share the benefits of our 
investigatory efforts, discovery and other information, as well as experts, thus 
achieving economies of scale.”  Id. (quoting letter from Milberg Weiss to Asbestos 
Workers Local 12 Annuity Fund (May 23, 2003)). 
 226. Id. at *6.   
 227. Id. at *7. 
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action options.”228  For example, the letters did not inform investors 
of the more restrictive statute of limitations applicable to 1933 Act 
claims, nor certain protections afforded class members in federal 
court in terms of adequacy of representation, distribution of awards, 
and curbs on attorney’s fees.229  As a result, Judge Cote ordered not 
only curative notices to members of the certified class before her, but 
separate notices to investors who had filed or could file individual 
actions in other courts.230 
Second, Judge Cote sought to neutralize the potentially disruptive 
effect of the pending individual actions in state courts on her 
management of the consolidated federal actions.231  To that end, 
Judge Cote sent a proposed coordination order to state court judges 
presiding over individual actions232 to prevent delay of or interference 
with the discovery and trial schedule for the consolidated actions in 
federal court.233  Specifically, her proposed order called for discovery 
in the federal and state actions to be coordinated, the PSLRA-
mandated stay of discovery in the federal actions to apply to the state 
actions, and no trial in the state actions to be set before the 
scheduled trial date of the federal actions in January 2005.234 
In defiance of this proposal, an Alabama state court judge set an 
individual case for trial beginning in October 2004.235  Judge Cote 
reasoned that this earlier trial in state court would delay the class 
action trial given the need for extensive motions practice to 
determine its collateral estoppel effect on the federal actions and the 
diversion of the time and energy of the defendants.236  Judge Cote 
resorted to invoking the All Writs Act237 to enjoin the state court trial 
                                                          
 228. Id.  
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at *8. 
 231. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 315 F. Supp. 2d 527, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 232. See id. at 531 n.3, 536 (noting pendency of Retirement Sys. of Ala. v. J.P. Morgan 
Chase & Co., No. CV 2002-1947(a)-PR (Ala. Cir. Ct. filed July 15, 2002)); City of 
Birmingham Ret. & Relief Fund v. Citigroup Inc., No. 03-2373(HLB) (Ala. Cir. Ct. Apr. 
15, 2003); Standard Life Inv., Ltd. v. Ebbers, No. 04-1938 (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 
2004); Illinois Mun. Ret. Fund v. Citigroup Inc., No. 03 L 772 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed  June 18, 
2003); and Steelworkers Pension Trust v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 030303441 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 
filed Mar. 21, 2003)). 
 233. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ.3288, 2004 WL 817355 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 30, 2004). 
 234. Id. at *2. 
 235. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 315 F. Supp. 2d at 538 (reviewing the 
scheduling actions of Judge Price in Retirement Systems of Alabama). 
 236. Id. at 545. 
 237. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000) (permitting federal courts to issue writs if 
necessary to aid their jurisdictions). 
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until the conclusion of the federal class action trial.238 However, the 
Second Circuit quickly and soundly reversed that decision.239 
Third, Judge Cote denied motions to remand individual 1933 Act 
actions removed to her from New York state court.240  Whereas 
plaintiffs’ lawyers had artfully pleaded individual actions under the 
1933 Act to remain in state court, the WorldCom Defendants241 were 
equally clever in removing these individual actions to federal court.  
As discussed above, SLUSA amended the non-removal provision of 
the 1933 Act only in terms of class action suits—the non-removal 
provision was still absolute with respect to individual actions.  
Nonetheless, the WorldCom Defendants removed the individual 
actions to federal court as actions “related to” the WorldCom 
bankruptcy pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a).242  The alleged “relation” 
of these individual actions to the WorldCom bankruptcy was the 
potential for contribution, indemnification, and contractual 
reimbursement claims by the WorldCom Defendants against 
WorldCom in a subsequent, separate lawsuit if the WorldCom 
Defendants were in fact found liable in these individual actions.243 
The plaintiffs filed motions for remand to state court on two 
grounds.  First, they argued that the non-removal provision of the 
1933 Act was absolute with no exception made for claims “related to” 
a bankruptcy.244  Second, they argued that, even if claims “related to” 
a bankruptcy could be removed in spite of the non-removal provision 
of the 1933 Act, their individual actions were not “related to” the 
WorldCom bankruptcy given the fact that WorldCom was not a 
defendant, and could be deemed effectively liable only in a separate 
subsequent action to be filed by the WorldCom Defendants against 
WorldCom.245  Judge Cote rejected both of these arguments, found 
no basis for abstention246 or equitable remand247 under the 
                                                          
 238. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 315 F. Supp. 2d at 551. 
 239. See Ret. Sys. of Ala. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 386 F.3d 419, 421 (2d Cir. 
2004) (holding that the “necessary in aid of its jurisdiction” exception to the 
Anti-Injunction Act does not allow a district court to preserve its trial date by 
enjoining state court proceedings). 
 240. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 241. WorldCom filed for bankruptcy in July 2002.  At that moment, the automatic 
stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code halted litigation against WorldCom.  11 U.S.C. 
§ 362 (2000).  However, plaintiffs proceeded with claims against WorldCom officers, 
directors, auditors, underwriters, and research analysts (hereinafter “WorldCom 
Defendants”). 
 242. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. at 310-12. 
 243. Id. at 316. 
 244. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 
2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1080 (2005). 
 245. Id. 
 246. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (2000) (providing that a district court may, “in the 
COOK.OFFTOPRINTER 2/22/2006  2:34:45 PM 
2006] RECRAFTING THE JURISDICTIONAL FRAMEWORK 657 
bankruptcy jurisdiction and removal statutes, and denied the motions 
for remand.248 
The Second Circuit accepted an interlocutory appeal of the denial 
of the motions for remand solely on the first argument raised by the 
plaintiffs before Judge Cote.249  As a “case of first impression in the 
courts of appeals,” the Second Circuit addressed “whether a federal 
district court may exercise bankruptcy jurisdiction over generally 
nonremovable claims brought under the Securities Act of 1933.”250  
This issue pitted two expressly conflicting provisions against each 
other:  the non-removal provision (Section 22(a)) of the 1933 Act, 
and Section 1452 of the federal removal statutes, which permits 
removal of claims that are “related to” a federal bankruptcy case.251 
The Second Circuit began its analysis with a comparative overview 
of the two removal provisions.  The bankruptcy removal provision was 
enacted in 1978 to “enable the bankruptcy courts . . . to dispose of 
controversies that arise in bankruptcy cases or under the bankruptcy 
code,” and to save the estate “great cost and delay” by trying such 
actions in the bankruptcy, as opposed to state or federal district 
court.252  Interestingly, the Second Circuit did not assess how the 
individual actions at issue would advance these forms of legislative 
intent.253  Indeed, the individual actions were before the district 
court—not the bankruptcy court administering the WorldCom 
estate—and resulted in no direct cost to WorldCom, which was not a 
named defendant.254 
                                                          
interest of justice,” abstain from hearing cases either relating to or arising out of Title 
11); id. § 1334(c)(2) (providing that a district court shall abstain from hearing state 
cases "related to a case under title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a 
case under title 11”). 
 247. See id. § 1452(b) (providing that if the bankruptcy claim is removed to district 
court, such district court may remand such a claim on “any equitable ground”). 
 248. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. at 334. 
 249. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 95.  The Second Circuit declined to 
review Judge Cote’s decision that the plaintiffs’ claims were “related to” the 
WorldCom bankruptcy “notwithstanding the tenuous connection between those 
claims and WorldCom’s reorganization process.”  Id. at 96.  In declining review, the 
Second Circuit stated that it was “not convinced [the Plaintiffs] raised a ‘question of 
law’” thus failing to meet the standard for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b).  Id.  Nor did the Second Circuit review Judge Cote’s decision that 
abstention and equitable remand were inappropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1334(c), 1452(b),  respectively.  Id. 
 250. Id. at 90. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 96-97 (citing S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 153 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5939). 
 253. See id. at 97 (stating only generally that Sections 1452(a) and 1334(b) were 
intended to centralize bankruptcy-related litigation in bankruptcy courts and 
decrease litigation costs to the estate). 
 254. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ.3288, 2003 WL 22953644, at 
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The Second Circuit then reviewed the history of the non-removal 
provision of the 1933 Act, specifically its having been amended for 
the first time by SLUSA and only with respect to class actions.255  The 
direct conflict thus arose:  “While the bankruptcy removal statute 
unambiguously states that any civil action brought by a private party 
in state court . . . may be removed to federal court if the action is 
related to a bankruptcy case, Section 22(a) of the [1933] Act states, in 
equally unambiguous terms, that individual actions under the [1933] 
Act may not be removed to state court.”256 
The Second Circuit employed a number of tools of statutory 
interpretation to address this conflict.  Its first tool—the maxim 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius257—was inconclusive, as both statutes 
contained express exceptions exclusive of the other.258  The court 
placed greater attention on its second tool, specificity, stating that 
“[w]here there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will 
not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the 
priority of enactment.”259 
The court first noted that neither statute was more specific directly 
in terms of the other:  “just as Section 1452(a) applies to many claims 
that are not brought under the 1933 Act, Section 22(a) applies to 
many claims that are not ‘related to’ a bankruptcy.”260  The court also 
found that Section 22(a) and Section 1452(a) were of similar scope 
in applying to a defined class of claims—as opposed to one applying 
                                                          
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2003) (noting retention of individual actions against the 
WorldCom Defendants—not WorldCom—in federal district court). 
 255. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 98. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See, e.g., United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 836 
(2001) (stating that, under this maxim, “[t]he logic that invests the omission with 
significance is familiar: the mention of some implies the exclusion of others not 
mentioned.”). 
 258. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 101.  The bankruptcy removal statute 
contains exceptions for “a proceeding before the United States Tax Court [and] a 
civil action by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s police or 
regulatory power . . . .”  28 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (2000).  The non-removal provision of 
the 1933 Act contains an exception “as provided in section 77p(c) of this title . . . .”  
15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2000).  In any event, this statutory maxim has been criticized as 
“a questionable one in light of the dubious reliability of inferring specific intent from 
silence.”  Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
2071, 2109 n.182 (1990).  Indeed, courts ignore the maxim when its application 
would lead to results producing an opposite effect from that intended by the 
legislation.  See, e.g., Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991); EEOC v. 
Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 120 (1988)(clarifying that where 
Congress is silent on a certain statutory application, no inference drawn from such 
silence may be “credited when it is contrary to all other textual and contextual 
evidence of congressional intent”). 
 259. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 101 (quoting Radzanower v. Touche 
Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976)). 
 260. Id. at 102. 
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to a “broad universe of potential defendants” and the other to a 
“particularized” group.261  However, the court did not consider just 
how expansive those classes of claims were, or how the particular 
claims before it fell specifically within those classes.  For example, 
whereas Section 22(a) applies to just a few narrow substantive claims 
addressing specific subjects, Section 1452(a) applies to claims of all 
subjects—depending only on whether they relate or do not relate to a 
bankruptcy.  Moreover, the claims at hand were specifically brought 
under the 1933 Act, and had at best a “tenuous connection” to the 
WorldCom bankruptcy.262 
The court also determined that even if Section 22(a) were more 
“specific,” its application would “unduly interfere” with the workings 
of Section 1452(a).263  That interference was seen as undue 
particularly in Chapter 11 cases involving “repetitive and time-
consuming discovery proceedings in multiple state courts.”264  
However, the court spoke of the bankruptcy-“related” nature of the 
1933 Act claims only in hypothetical terms—the potential for 
contribution and indemnification sought by defendants in separate 
actions against WorldCom which “can, in some circumstances, affect 
the administration of a bankrupt estate.”265  In other words, there was 
no mention as to how these actions would actually interfere with the 
administration of WorldCom, which was not even a named defendant 
in the removed actions.  Moreover, the court did not address how the 
WorldCom estate would be affected any more or less if 1933 Act 
claims were remanded to and tried in state court versus remaining in 
federal district court.  Indeed, regardless of where these predicate 
actions were tried, the WorldCom Defendants—if in fact found liable 
in those actions—would have to file separate subsequent actions for 
contribution or indemnification. 
Ultimately, the Second Circuit found the “specificity” inquiry to be 
inconclusive.266  With no solution yielded from its first two analyses, 
the court turned to the “rule of recency,” namely that “when two 
statutes are in irreconcilable conflict, we must give effect to the most 
                                                          
 261. Id. (quoting Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 148, 153-54). 
 262. Id. at 96. 
 263. Id. at 103 (citing Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 148, 156). 
 264. Id. at 104. 
 265. Id.  The Second Circuit supported its decision on these observations despite 
elsewhere finding a “tenuous connection between those claims and WorldCom’s 
reorganization process,” id. at 96, and declining to address whether the claims in the 
case fell within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a).  Id. at 108. 
 266. See id. at 104 (abandoning the specificity analysis based on the conclusion 
that Section 22(a) is not more narrow in class coverage than Section 1452(a)). 
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recently enacted statute . . . .”267  Whereas the bankruptcy removal 
provision was enacted in 1978,268 Section 22(a) was enacted earlier in 
1933 but amended later in 1998.269  The Court did not find the more 
recent amendment of Section 22(a) “particularly probative,” because 
Congress expressed an intent not to “alter the jurisdictional scheme 
applicable to individual actions under the 1933 Act.”270  At the same 
time, it can be said that in 1998 Congress simply reaffirmed the non-
removal of all 1933 Act individual claims—even those “related to” a 
bankruptcy—as part of its complex amendment to Section 22(a).271  
Moreover, while the court acknowledged that repeals by implication 
are disfavored, its ultimate decision was in fact a repeal by implication 
of Section 22(a).272 
Indeed, the Second Circuit found no basis for resolving the conflict 
in any of these maxims of statutory construction.  Rather, the court 
resorted to a contextual analysis of Section 1452(a) as a component 
of the general removal jurisdiction scheme of Title 28.273  Section 
1441(a) is the general removal statute, and allows for removal of cases 
over which the federal courts have original jurisdiction “[e]xcept as 
otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress”—for example, 
Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act.274  Because Section 1452(a) contains 
no such exception, the court reasoned that “Congress did not intend 
for Section 22(a) and its analogues to bar removal of ‘related to’ 
claims.”275  In the court’s view, if the removal of a claim subject to a 
non-removal provision is by means of Section 1441(a), removal is not 
warranted given the exception in that provision.276  On the other 
                                                          
 267. Id. (quoting In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 922 F.2d 984, 991 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
 268. The bankruptcy removal provision took its current form (28 U.S.C. § 1452) 
in the enactment of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 269. On November 3, 1998, Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 270. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 104 (emphasis in original); see also 
supra note 119 (emphasizing that SLUSA focuses on class action litigation without 
intent to affect state individual lawsuits). 
 271. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 381-
82 (1982) (stating that when Congress undergoes a “comprehensive reexamination 
and significant amendment” of a statute and leaves certain provisions “intact,” this 
serves to indicate that Congress “affirmatively intended” preservation of such 
provision). 
 272. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 104 (quoting Henderson v. INS, 157 
F.3d 106, 119 (2d Cir. 1998)); see Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 296 U.S. 497, 503 
(1936) (stating the “cardinal rule” that “repeals by implication are not favored”). 
 273. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 105. 
 274. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000). 
 275. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 106. 
 276. Id. at 107. 
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hand, “[i]f removal is being effectuated through a provision that 
confers additional removal jurisdiction [i.e., Section 1452(a)], and 
that provision contains no exception for non-removable federal 
claims, the provision should be given full effect.”277  Otherwise, if 
Section 22(a) were to trump Section 1452(a), the exception in 
Section 1441(a) “would serve no apparent purpose.”278 
The Second Circuit justified this contextual analysis primarily on its 
prior holding that another removal statute without the exception 
found in Section 1441(a), Section 1441(c), trumped a federal non-
removal provision.279  Despite this one similarity of omission, Section 
1441(c) and Section 1452(a) have a far more significant substantive 
distinction of greater relevance to the issue before the Second 
Circuit.  Unlike any other removal statute, Section 1441(c) expressly 
permits the removal of “otherwise non-removable claims” such as 
those under the 1933 Act.280  In providing for the removal of 
otherwise non-removable claims, it is inconceivable that Section 
1441(c) would also contain the Section 1441(a) exception.  
Therefore, the absence of the Section 1441(a) exception from 
Section 1441(c) should be considered inapposite.  Moreover, in 
Gonsalves v. Amoco Shipping Co., the decision on which it was relying, 
the Second Circuit had emphasized that the specific statutory 
conditions must be met “before the force of section 1441(c) can 
defeat the congressional preference expressed in [the federal non-
removal provision].”281  Here, conversely, the Second Circuit saw fit to 
set aside this “congressional preference” even where the removal 
statute was silent as to the removal of otherwise non-removable 
claims.282 
This contextual analysis of the general removal statutes was the sole 
factor tipping the balance in favor of Section 1452(a).  Otherwise, 
each of the factors evaluated by the Second Circuit favored Section 
22(a) at least as much as Section 1452(a).  Just as “Congress did not 
manifest an intent to alter preexisting law when it amended the 1933 
Act in 1998,” the same could have been said that Congress did not 
manifest an intent to alter preexisting law—namely, the non-removal 
                                                          
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at 106. 
 279. Id. at 106-07 (citing Gonsalves v. Amoco Shipping Co., 733 F.2d 1020, 1022-23 
(2d Cir. 1984)). 
 280. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2000). 
 281. Gonsalves, 733 F.2d at 1026. 
 282. See Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 106-07 (remarking that Section 
1441(c) permitted removal of non-removable claims in certain instances (citing 
Gonsalves, 733 F.2d at 1022-23)). 
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of 1933 Act claims under Section 22(a)—when it enacted Section 
1452(a) in 1978.283  Whereas “Section 1452(a) contains no exception 
for federal claims that are expressly nonremovable under an Act of 
Congress,” Section 22(a)—both before and after 1998—contains no 
exception for claims “related to” a bankruptcy.284  And though the 
Court declined to “create a distinction between two classes of ‘related 
to’ claims that is wholly absent from the bankruptcy removal statute,” 
it saw fit to create such a distinction wholly absent from the 1933 Act 
between claims “related to” and “unrelated to” a bankruptcy.285 
Of particular note, the Second Circuit answered this “close 
question” without even a mention of the well-established core 
principle developed in its own circuit and throughout the federal 
courts:  that “federal courts construe the removal statute narrowly, 
resolving any doubts against removability.”286  To the contrary, the 
Second Circuit considered none of the numerous, expressly-
acknowledged uncertainties in its comparative analysis to weigh 
against removal, and construed the removal statutes broadly—
particularly those statutes which provide “additional removal 
jurisdiction.”287  In sum, the Second Circuit appears to have been 
fixated on reaching a certain end rather than applying certain 
fundamental means of statutory interpretation. 
The Second Circuit has been the only appellate court to address 
this statutory conflict.288  At the district court level, however, some 
courts foreshadowed the Second Circuit’s decision in finding in favor 
                                                          
 283. Id. at 105. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 108. 
 286. Lupo v. Human Affairs Int’l, Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 274 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing 
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941)); see Romero v. Int’l 
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 (1959) (noting the “traditional 
reluctance” of the Court to give jurisdictional statutes a broad reading); Russell 
Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001) (identifying 
the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts and noting that where uncertainty exists 
concerning removal jurisdiction, the favored resolution is remand); Coyne v. Am. 
Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir.1999) (affirming that remand is the proper 
course of action where doubt exists concerning the “propriety of removal”). 
 287. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 368 F.3d at 107 (emphasis in original). 
 288. Other circuit courts have received appeals of remand orders on the same 
issues, but have denied them based on the limited scope of appellate review of 
remand orders.  See, e.g., Ill. Mun. Ret. Fund v. Citigroup, Inc., 391 F.3d 844, 850-52 
(7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the circuit court may only “review the contested exercise 
of authority without considering the reasoning in the district court’s remand order,” 
and concluding that “the district court did not exceed its authority in issuing a 
remand order”); Ret. Sys. of Ala. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. 02-15385, 2003 WL 
23526878, at *1 (11th Cir. June 19, 2003) (finding lack of jurisdiction to consider 
whether district court abused its discretion in remanding action to state court  based 
on constitutionality of statutory provisions barring appellate review). 
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of Section 1452 on at least one maxim of statutory interpretation.289  
However, as is to be expected given the numerous infirmities of the 
Second Circuit’s opinion, other district courts have resolved the 
statutory conflict in favor of the non-removal provision of the 1933 
Act on a variety of grounds.290  Some courts have disagreed with the 
Second Circuit’s application of both the rule of recency291 and 
specificity.292  Still other courts have found no conflict between the 
two statutes based on their affirmative answer to the question not 
addressed by the Second Circuit:  that potential indemnification 
claims against the bankruptcy estate to be brought in a separate 
lawsuit are not “related to” the bankruptcy.293  Additional courts have 
                                                          
 289. See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308, 328-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(using “inclusio unius est exclusio alterius” to find that 1933 Act claims may be removed 
under Section 1452(a)); In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. Sec. & Derivative Litig., No. 
03 Civ. 5794, 2003 WL 23018802, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2003); In re Global Crossing 
Ltd. Sec. Litig., Nos. 20 Civ. 910, 02 Civ. 10199, 2003 WL 21659360, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 15, 2003) (giving preference to the bankruptcy removal statute over the 1933 
Act’s removal prohibition, based on the rule of recency); Carpenters Pension Trust 
for S. Cal. v. Ebbers, 299 B.R. 610, 615 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (applying the rule of recency 
in favor of Section 1452); Pac. Life Ins. Co. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. SA CV 
03-813GLT, 2003 WL 22025158, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2003) (stating that in this 
case removal was based on “related to” jurisdiction, not federal question jurisdiction, 
thus removal was not prevented by Section 22(a)). 
 290. See Ill. Mun. Ret. Fund v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 03-465, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16255, at *5-9 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2003); City of Birmingham Ret. & Relief Fund v. 
Citigroup, Inc., No. CV-03-BE-0994-S, 2003 WL 22697225, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 12, 
2003); Steel Workers Pension Trust v. Citigroup, Inc., 295 B.R. 747, 753-54 (E.D. Pa. 
2003); Tenn. Consol. Ret. Sys. v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 3:03-0128, 2003 WL 22190841, 
at *4 (M.D. Tenn. May 9, 2003); Ret. Sys. of Ala. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 285 B.R. 
519, 530-31 (M.D. Ala. 2002); Ret. Sys. of Ala. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 
1257, 1270 (M.D. Ala. 2002); Ariail Drug Co., Inc. v. Lease Partners Corp., No. CIV. 
A. 96-G-0708-S, 1996 WL 1060890, at *4-5 (N.D. Ala. May 23, 1996); In re VideOcart, 
Inc., 165 B.R. 740, 743-44 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994).  
 291. See Tenn. Consol. Ret. Sys., 2003 WL 22190841, at *3 n.2 (finding rule of 
recency favors Section 22(a) because “SLUSA, a 1998 statute amending the 1933 Act, 
is the relevant comparative statute, not the original 1933 Act”). 
 292. See City of Birmingham Ret. & Relief Fund, 2003 WL 22697225, at *3 (finding 
that “Section 22 . . . takes priority over the general removal statutes” because it 
“specifically precludes removal”); Tenn. Consol. Ret. Sys., 2003 WL 22190841, at *3 
(holding that Section 22(a), as amended by SLUSA, is a “special statute”); Ill. Mun. 
Ret. Fund, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16255, at *6 (determining that Section 22(a) should 
control over the more general provisions found in Section 1452). 
 293. See, e.g., City of Birmingham Ret. & Relief Fund, 2003 WL 22697225, at *5 
(holding that the “primary action” has no effect on the WorldCom estate as it only 
acts as a potential indemnification claim); Steel Workers Pension Trust, 295 B.R. at 750 
(stating that an indemnification agreement alone does not provide the “nexus 
necessary” to establish “related to” jurisdiction); Ill. Mun. Ret. Fund, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16255, at *7 (finding that the suit at issue will not affect the administration or 
size of the WorldCom bankruptcy estate); Ariail Drug Co., Inc., 1996 WL 1060890, at 
*3 (refusing to accept that a lawsuit regarding debtor’s interests against third party 
was “related to” bankruptcy proceedings); In re VideOcart, Inc., 165 B.R. at 744 
(remanding without addressing the Section 22(a)/1452(a) conflict because action by 
“non-debtor against non-debtors” is not closely enough “related to” the court’s 
jurisdiction as it only concerns potential claims).  Indeed, the seminal decision 
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declined jurisdiction for another reason not addressed by the Second 
Circuit:  abstention under the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute given 
the “attenuated connection” between claims against non-debtors and 
bankruptcy proceedings.294  Notably, these remand decisions are 
consistent with how courts have uniformly resolved an analogous 
conflict in favor of the non-removal provision of the Jones Act over 
Section 1452(a).295 
As the discussion above reveals, courts have struggled not only with 
how to interpret the plain meaning of SLUSA’s amendment to the 
non-removal provision of the 1933 Act, but also how to deal with the 
practical implications of the loopholes left in its wake.  The fact that 
courts have been far from unanimous on both issues reveals just how 
deep the ambiguities in the statute are.  Moreover, the length to 
which courts have gone to try to defuse the impact of orchestrated 
exploitation of jurisdictional loopholes accentuates the need for 
immediate legislative action. 
III. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE NON-REMOVAL                          
PROVISION OF THE 1933 ACT 
There are numerous ambiguities and contradictions in the 
jurisdictional provisions of the federal securities laws, not just in 
theory, but as proven recently, in practice with real ramifications on 
the conduct of securities fraud litigation.  Whereas Congress was 
silent in enacting the jurisdictional provisions over seventy years 
ago,296 it has expressed a current intent to expand federal jurisdiction 
                                                          
establishing the “conceivable effect” standard for “related to” jurisdiction held that 
indemnification claims to be brought in a later lawsuit were not “related to” a 
bankruptcy proceeding.  Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 995 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(finding a potential third-party action is not “related to” bankruptcy because the 
estate will not be affected unless the third-party action is actually commenced). 
 294. Tenn. Consol. Ret. Sys., 2003 WL 22190841, at *4 (exercising discretion to 
abstain based on judicial efficiency and comity concerns); see Ret. Sys. of Ala., 209 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1269; Ill. Mun. Ret. Fund, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16255, at *9; Ret. Sys. of 
Ala., 285 B.R. at 531 (exercising discretionary abstention because “action is relatively 
remote from the bankruptcy proceeding in that it will not have any effect on 
WorldCom’s bankruptcy estate”). 
 295. See, e.g., Bennett v. United Kingdom Mut. Steam Ship Assurance Assoc. 
(Bermuda) Ltd., No. CIV. A. 98-3237, 1999 WL 13996, at *1-2 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 
1999); McRae v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., No. Civ. A. 98-3240, 1998 WL 898467, at 
*1 (E.D. La. Dec. 22, 1998) (finding that preserving Jones Act plaintiff’s choice of 
forum outweighed the “possib[ility] that the tort actions against the insurer . . . could 
affect the bankruptcy”); In re Durheim, 215 B.R. 876, 879-80 (D. Alaska 1997) 
(finding that if a Jones Act action commences in state court, it should not be 
removed to federal court because of the existence of a “strong Congressional policy 
against removal of [Jones Act] claims” even where concurrent jurisdiction exists); In 
re U.S. Lines, Inc., 128 B.R. 339, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Kinder v. Wis. Barge Line, Inc., 
69 B.R. 11, 13 (E.D. Mo. 1986). 
 296. See supra Part I.A. 
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in both the securities and class action contexts.297  Yet this intent 
remains largely stunted by the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act, 
the plain language of which (even as amended by SLUSA) still 
prevents the removal of all individual actions and most class actions 
brought under the 1933 Act.298  As a result, whereas Congress 
intended to “provide for the shifting of securities lawsuits [involving 
nationally-traded securities] filed in a state court into the more 
appropriate federal court” and spare defendants from having to “face 
liability under federal securities law in fifty state courts,”299 issuers, 
auditors, underwriters, directors, officers, and research analysts have 
in fact had to defend simultaneously against both massive 
consolidated actions in federal court and scores of individual actions 
in state courts across the country.300 
This Article recommends an express amendment of the non-
removal provision to allow for the removal of 1933 Act claims which 
“sound in fraud.”  As explained below, if a 1933 Act claim appears in 
a complaint containing fraud allegations, that claim should be subject 
to removal.  This would hold true even if such fraud allegations 
support an accompanying Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim and are 
expressly disavowed for purposes of the 1933 Act claim.  On the other 
hand, if the complaint alleges only negligent or innocent conduct, 
the 1933 Act claims may remain in state court. 
This demarcation recognizes both the unique role of fraud in 1933 
Act claims and their interrelation with 1934 Act claims.301  Indeed, 
plaintiffs can—and often do—bring both 1933 Act and 1934 Act 
claims for the same underlying wrong.  However, whereas causes of 
action under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 are for 
fraud, the 1933 Act allows plaintiffs to sue for misrepresentations or 
omissions on theories of fraud, negligence, or even strict liability.302  
In such instances, 1933 Act claims—although not necessarily for 
fraud—may be pled in large part based on allegations of fraud.  
Because of the jurisdictional framework of the federal securities laws 
and the overlapping substantive bases of various causes of action 
thereunder, the same fraud can generate litigation in both individual 
and class actions in both state and federal court.  The proposed 
amendment would erase this jurisdictional disparity.  All actions 
alleging securities fraud—whether under the 1933 Act or 1934 Act—
                                                          
 297. See supra Part I.C, E. 
 298. See supra Part II.A-B. 
 299. 144 CONG. REC. S4796 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
 300. See supra notes 218-222 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra notes 35, 56-65, 70 and accompanying text. 
 302. Id. 
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would be heard in federal court.  All actions alleging just negligence 
and strict liability, which are more akin to state common law actions, 
could be filed and remain in state court. 
As discussed next, a “sound in fraud” distinction for jurisdictional 
purposes is supported by the recent use of that exact distinction in 
interpreting other features of private securities actions.303  As 
discussed thereafter, there are numerous advantages to adding this 
distinction to the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act.  Most 
importantly, a “sound in fraud” distinction would harmonize the 
statute with various expressions of legislative intent throughout the 
history of the federal securities laws.304  This proposal would have the 
added procedural benefit of nullifying yet another byproduct of 
forum shopping of particular import in the federal securities 
context—piecemeal litigation under Section 1441(c) of the federal 
removal statutes.305  Finally, the proposal would streamline the 
securities fraud “race for the assets” in federal courts under uniform 
standards in the interests of both judicial economy and fairness to 
defrauded investors.306 
A. Legislative Use of the “Sound in Fraud” Demarcation 
Congress has already shown an affinity for demarcating the federal 
securities laws based on fraud.  In 2002, Congress passed the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in quick response to a string of massive corporate 
frauds.307  This time, investors required protection from corporate 
wrongdoers committing securities fraud rather than plaintiffs’ lawyers 
raising such allegations.308  That protection extended to private 
litigants in just one respect:  a prolonged limitations period.  
Interestingly, Congress did not extend the period to specific federal 
securities law provisions or just to fraud claims in name alone, but to 
“a private right of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit, 
manipulation, or contrivance of a regulatory requirement concerning 
the securities laws . . . .”309 
The applicability of this provision to 1933 Act claims is not obvious.  
Without identifying any particular statutory provision, this new 
                                                          
 303. See infra Part III.A-B. 
 304.  See infra Part III.C. 
 305.  See infra Part III.D. 
 306. See infra Part III.E; see also In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308, 334 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that ensuing litigation would be wasteful to the extent it 
may deprive “many victims of . . . fraud of their fair share of any recovery”). 
 307. See supra note 126. 
 308. See supra notes 126-127. 
 309. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658(b) (West 2002) (emphasis 
added). 
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limitations period apparently applies universally to the 1933 Act and 
1934 Act despite the fact that it conflicts with various express 
limitations periods therein.310  However, both the plain language and 
legislative history of Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act suggest a 
differentiation of 1933 Act claims depending on whether they 
“involve” fraud.  Congress generally intended to extend “the time 
that people have to go in and do something about fraud.”311  To that 
end, Congress did not limit the scope of the extended limitations 
period to fraud claims in name alone.  Nor did Congress limit this 
period to claims under any particular statutory provision.  In other 
words, Congress sought to assist victims of fraud—regardless of the 
federal securities law provision (i.e., the 1933 Act versus the 1934 Act) 
under which they might bring their claims—as opposed to those 
seeking recovery for only negligent or innocent misrepresentations.  
As a result, Congress appears to have treated 1933 Act claims 
disparately depending on whether they “involve” fraud. 
B. Judicial Use of the “Sound in Fraud” Demarcation 
Courts have similarly displayed a recent tendency to demarcate 
1933 Act claims based on fraud in two areas of federal securities 
jurisprudence:  (1) Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and (2) Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
1. Rule 9(b):  Pleading fraud with particularity 
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
“[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.”312  
Because Rule 9(b) applies to “all averments of fraud,” not just claims 
of fraud, it may apply to allegations regardless of whether they are 
“styled or denominated as fraud or expressed in terms of the 
constituent elements of a fraud cause of action.”313  Even though 
fraud is not a required element of 1933 Act claims, most courts have 
applied Rule 9(b) “insofar as the claims are premised on allegations 
of fraud.”314  In other words, courts determine whether the 1933 Act 
claim “sounds in fraud.”315 
                                                          
 310. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77m, 78r(c) (2000). 
 311. 148 CONG. REC. H4846 (daily ed. July 17, 2002) (statement of Rep. Markey); 
see 148 CONG. REC. S6535 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (saying 
that an extended limitations period should, “when there has been such enormous 
fraud[,] give [plaintiffs] at least some chance to recover something”). 
 312. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 313. Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 314. Id.; see also, e.g., In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1027 (9th Cir. 2005) 
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For purposes of Rule 9(b), a 1933 Act claim “sounds in fraud” if 
“an examination of the factual allegations that support Plaintiffs’ 
[1933 Act] claim establishes that the claims are indisputably 
immersed in unparticularized allegations of fraud.”316  For example, 
Rule 9(b) would apply “if a plaintiff were to attempt to establish 
violations of [the 1933 Act] as well as the anti-fraud provisions of the 
[1934] Act through allegations in a single complaint or a unified 
course of fraudulent conduct.”317  Although 1933 Act claims often 
disavow allegations of fraud made elsewhere in the complaint, that is 
“insufficient to divorce the claims from their fraudulent 
underpinnings” for purposes of Rule 9(b).318  If the complaint uses 
                                                          
(stating that claims that “sound in fraud” must satisfy the heightened procedural 
requirements of Rule 9(b)); Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 
126 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that allegations brought under the 1933 Act which 
“sound in fraud” are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b)).  
But see Kapps v. Torch Offshore, Inc., 379 F.3d 207, 210 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining 
that Section 11 claims only mandate notice pleading as opposed to the more detailed 
pleading required by Rule 9(b) or the PSLRA); In re NationsMart Corp. Sec. Litig., 
130 F.3d 309, 314 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that “Rule 9(b) does not apply to claims 
under § 11 of the [1933] Act, because proof of fraud or mistake is not a prerequisite 
to establishing liability under § 11”). 
 315. Rombach, 355 F.3d at 167; see also, e.g., In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d at 1027 
(“Although section 11 does not contain an element of fraud, a plaintiff may 
nonetheless be subject to Rule 9(b)’s particularity mandate if his complaint ‘sounds 
in fraud . . .’”); In re Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 273 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(noting that 1933 Act claims which do not “sound in fraud” need not comply with 
the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) (citing Shapiro v. UJB Fin. 
Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 288 (3d Cir. 1992))); Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 
1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that 1933 Act claims which “sound in 
fraud” must comply with Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement); Schwartz v. Celestial 
Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 1997) (refusing to apply Rule 9(b) 
requirement to a 1933 Act claim not “premised on fraud”); In re Stac Elec. Sec. Litig., 
89 F.3d 1399, 1404 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that Rule 9(b) applies to 1933 Act claims 
“grounded in fraud”); Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1223 (1st Cir. 
1996) (determining that Rule 9(b) applies to 1933 Act claims which “sound in 
fraud”); Shapiro, 964 F.2d at 288 (“[T]he plain language of [Rule 9(b)] clearly 
encompasses § 11 and § 12(2) claims based on fraud . . .”); Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 
889, 893 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that Rule 9(b) applies to 1933 Act claims “sounding 
in fraud”). 
 316. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 394 F.3d at 160. 
 317. Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1223; see also Vess, 317 F.3d at 1103-04 (explaining that a 
claim may “sound in fraud” and must meet Rule 9(b)’s requirements even if fraud is 
not a necessary element of the claim so long as the plaintiff alleges that the 
defendant engaged in a unified course of fraudulent conduct and this course of 
conduct is the basis for the plaintiff’s claim). 
 318. Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 394 F.3d at 160; see Rombach, 355 F.3d at 172 
(rejecting an effort by plaintiffs to avoid the requirements of Rule 9(b) through a 
characterization of their claims in their pleading); In re Stac Elec. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 
at 1405 n.2 (holding that disavowal of fraud allegations is “unconvincing where the 
gravamen of the complaint is plainly fraud and no effort is made to show any other 
basis for the claims levied at the Prospectus.”); In re Ultrafem, Inc. Sec. Litig., 91 F. 
Supp. 2d 678, 690-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (applying Rule 9(b) where plaintiffs simply 
disavowed that Rule 9(b) was applicable and made no other effort to differentiate 
between their negligence and fraud claims). 
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words or imputations which are “classically associated with fraud”319 
without making any effort to show an additional basis for a 1933 Act 
claim, then the claim “sounds in fraud” and is subject to Rule 9(b).320 
2. Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
As discussed above, Congress enacted a fraud demarcation of 
federal securities causes of action in Section 804 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.  Thus far, courts have unanimously held that that 
provision does not apply to Section 11 and 12 claims under the 1933 
Act.321  However, these holdings pertain to a certain subset of 1933 
Act claims:  those which expressly disavow any and all fraud 
allegations or otherwise do not “sound in fraud.”322  In other words, 
no court has directly addressed whether Section 804 applies to a 1933 
Act claim “sounding in fraud.” 
Courts are increasingly indicating that the “sound in fraud” 
distinction also applies to 1933 Act claims for purposes of Section 804 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Some courts have expressly found Section 
804 inapplicable on the distinguishing fact that “plaintiffs’ claim 
under § 11 of the Securities Act does not sound in fraud and [the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act] applies only to fraud claims.”323  Reflecting the 
                                                          
 319. Rombach, 355 F.3d at 172.  Such words “classically associated with fraud” 
include “inaccurate and misleading,” “untrue statements of material facts,” and 
“materially false and misleading written statements.”  Id. 
 320. In re Stac Elec. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d at 1405 n.2. 
 321. See, e.g., Ballard v. Tyco Int’l, No. 02-MD-1335-PB, 2005 WL 928537 (D.N.H. 
Apr. 22, 2005); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 02 Civ.3288, 03 Civ. 9499, 2004 
WL 1435356 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2004); ATO RAM II, Ltd. v. SMC Multimedia Corp., 
No. 03 Civ. 5569 HB, 2004 WL 744792 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2004); In re FirstEnergy 
Corp. Sec. Litig., 316 F. Supp. 2d 581 (N.D. Ohio 2004) ; Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension 
Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., No. 02 C S893, 2004 WL 574665 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 
2004); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., No. MDL-1446, 2004 WL 
405886 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2004); In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 
910, 2003 WL 22999478 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2003); Friedman v. Rayovac Corp., 295 F. 
Supp. 2d 957, 975 (W.D. Wis. 2003); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 
431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 272 
F. Supp. 2d 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (all refusing to extend the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to 
claims under Section 11 or 12 of the 1933 Act).  
 322. See, e.g., Ballard, 2005 WL 928537, at *4 n.4 (noting that the plaintiffs 
specifically stated that their Section 11 claim did not “sound in fraud” and excluded 
all allegations of fraud from that claim); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 
1435356, at *4 n.6 (commenting that “the plaintiffs’ pleading expressly denies that 
its [1933] Act claims sound in fraud”); In re FirstEnergy Corp. Sec. Litig., 316 F. 
Supp. 2d at 602 (finding that plaintiffs did not intentionally claim fraud allegations); 
Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan, 2004 WL 574665, at *13 n.1 (noting that the plaintiff 
disavowed that its 1933 Act claims were anything other than strict liability or 
negligence claims); In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 313 F. Supp. 2d at 197 n.4 
(noting that plaintiffs specifically disavowed and disclaimed any allegations of fraud). 
 323. Ballard, 2005 WL 928537, at *4; see In re Alcatel Sec. Litig., 382 F. Supp. 2d 
532, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that Section 804 would apply if the claims “sound in 
fraud”); In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 365 n.16 (D. 
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prevalence of the “sounding in fraud” concept, one court has even 
mistakenly averred that “Section 804 expressly states that it applies to 
‘claims sounding in fraud’”324—when it actually states that it applies to 
claims “involv[ing]” fraud. 
Judicial interpretation of the virtually identical phrase “claim 
involving fraud” in another federal statute suggests a “sound in fraud” 
distinction for purposes of Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
The Contract Disputes Act provides that the United States Claims 
Court has subject matter jurisdiction over claims thereunder, except 
for “any claim involving fraud.”325  In construing that exception, 
courts have noted that a claim can “involve” fraud even if fraud is not 
a required element.326  Rather, claims “involving fraud” encompass 
“claims which arise from the same actions that lead to the fraud claim 
and merely constitute alternative pleadings.”327  1933 Act claims are 
often just that:  alternative theories of recovery for the same alleged 
fraudulent scheme underlying Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claims. 
C. Consistency with Legislative Intent 
A demarcation of 1933 Act claims based on fraud not only is 
already employed in federal securities legislation and jurisprudence, 
but also would harmonize the federal securities jurisdictional 
framework with the legislative history of both the 1933 Act itself and 
the recent enactments pertaining to private securities actions and, 
more generally, class actions. 
                                                          
Md. 2004) (stating that Section 804 applies to fraud-based claims but Section 804 
does not apply to Section 11 or Section 12 claims which do not “sound in fraud”); In 
re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d at 441 (recognizing that Section 804 
applies to claims under the 1933 Act and 1934 Act which “sound in fraud”); see also In 
re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 2004 WL 405886, at *11 (recognizing 
that the availability of Section 804’s longer statute of limitations under a 1933 Act 
claim depends upon whether the claim “involves ‘fraud, deceit, manipulation, or 
contrivance’”); Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan, 2004 WL 574665, at *13 (concluding 
that the extended limitations period under Section 804 is inapplicable to non-fraud-
based 1933 Act claims). 
 324. In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 192, 208 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 325. 41 U.S.C. § 605(a) (2000). 
 326. See infra note 327. 
 327. United States v. United Techs., Corp., No. C-3-99-03, 2000 WL 988238, at *4 
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 2000); see also United States v. Baker & Taylor, Inc., No. C-95-
1825, 1998 WL 230979, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 1998) (determining that claims 
“involve fraud” where they “serve as alternative theories of recovery for the alleged 
fraudulent pricing scheme”); United States v. Unified Indus., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 947, 
951 (E.D. Va. 1996) (declaring that breach of contract claim “involved fraud” 
because it was “intimately bound up with and part of the same case or controversy as” 
fraud claim); United States v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1131, 1135 (N.D. Ga. 
1992) (noting that a claim “involves fraud” where “the events, transactions, and 
contracts at issue in the lawsuit give rise to fraud allegations”). 
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As discussed above, there is no indication of exactly why Congress 
enacted the non-removal provision in 1933.328  However, given the 
overriding theme of investor protection in the 1933 Act and the 
express intent of the few other federal non-removal statutes, it is 
likely that the protection of the plaintiff’s choice of forum was 
paramount.329  This proposed amendment to the non-removal 
provision preserves that implicit legislative intent, as plaintiffs may 
still remain in state court on 1933 Act claims if they plead their claims 
on a certain factual predicate.  In other words, plaintiffs would only 
face removal if the gravamen of their claim is fraudulent conduct—
that is, if the misrepresentations or omissions underlying the 1933 
Act claim are part of overarching fraudulent conduct. 
Moreover, given that the legislative history of the federal securities 
laws itself sounds in fraud, there is an apparent intent to have all 
securities fraud litigation heard in federal court.  The 1933 Act and 
1934 Act served to deter the commission of fraud.330  In 1995, the 
PSLRA was enacted to put an end to the abuses of securities fraud 
class actions.331  As a result, a significant portion of the PSLRA—most 
notably, the heightened pleading requirements—applies only to 
fraud claims under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5.332  
Moreover, most of the PSLRA’s measures apply only to actions filed 
in federal court.333 
In 1998, SLUSA was enacted to prevent plaintiffs from avoiding the 
PSLRA’s mandates by filing claims in state court.  As a result, SLUSA 
perpetuated the particular concerns over securities fraud litigation.  
Congress made this clear in its express legislative findings:  “[I]n 
order to prevent certain State private securities class action lawsuits 
alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objectives of the 
                                                          
 328. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 329. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text. 
 330. See supra notes 44, 66 and accompanying text. 
 331. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 39 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
730, 738 (“The Conference Committee recognizes the need to reduce significantly 
the filing of meritless securities lawsuits without hindering the ability of victims of 
fraud to pursue legitimate claims.”); 141 CONG. REC. 35300 (1995) (statement of Sen. 
Grams) (explaining that the PSLRA would “make some modest and reasonable 
changes which will help weed out the most abusive lawsuits in the field of securities 
litigation while at the same time, preserving the right of action for shareholders who 
are truly victimized by securities fraud”); 141 CONG. REC. 17546 (1995) (statement of 
Sen. Rockefeller) (“[The PSLRA] would go a long way toward curtailing what I 
believe is an epidemic of frivolous securities fraud lawsuits that are brought by a 
small cadre of lawyers”).  Indeed, three years later, Congress expressly highlighted 
the fact that the PSLRA was passed in an effort to prevent abuses in the filing of 
private securities fraud lawsuits.  H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, § 2, ¶ 1 (1998) (Conf. Rep.). 
 332. See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text. 
 333. See supra note 113. 
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[PSLRA], it is appropriate to enact national standards for securities 
class action lawsuits involving nationally traded securities . . . .”334  In 
other words, “[t]he solution to this problem is to make Federal court 
the exclusive venue for most securities fraud class action litigation 
involving nationally traded securities.”335  This theme recurred 
throughout the SLUSA debates.336 
Fraud claims have therefore been targeted as the main conduit 
through which plaintiffs’ lawyers seek maximum settlements based on 
minimum allegations of wrongdoing.  The PSLRA heightened the 
requirements for such claims, and SLUSA sought to have such 
requirements more uniformly applied under federal law in federal 
courts.337  Yet, Congress’ work is unfinished.  Sophisticated plaintiffs’ 
lawyers have foregone fraud claims under the 1934 Act in order to 
bring quasi-fraud claims under the 1933 Act for the same wrongdoing 
under different standards in different fora—namely, state courts 
across the country. 
                                                          
 334. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 2, ¶ 5, Pub. L. No. 105-
353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (emphasis added); see 
also supra note 124. 
 335. H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 15 (emphasis added).  Indeed, courts have defined 
the scope of state law claims falling within the purview of SLUSA based on fraud 
being a “necessary component” thereof.  See, e.g., Xpedior Creditor Trust v. Credit 
Suisse First Boston (USA) Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2d 258, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding 
that a state law claim falls under SLUSA if it “asserts (1) an explicit claim of fraud 
(e.g., common law fraud or fraudulent inducement), or (2) other garden-variety state 
law claims that ‘sound in fraud’”). 
 336. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H10771 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998) (statement of Rep. 
Bliley) (“If there is intentional fraud, there is nothing in [SLUSA] or in the [PSLRA] 
to prevent those cases from proceeding.  We do not need to exacerbate market 
downturns by allowing companies to be dragged into court every time their stock 
price falls.  The [PSLRA] remedied that problem for Federal courts, and this 
legislation will remedy it for State courts.”); 144 CONG. REC. S12447 (daily ed. Oct. 
13, 1998) (statement of Sen. Domenici) (recognizing SLUSA was designed to 
“provide one set of rules to govern securities fraud class actions”); id. at S12448 
(statement of Sen. Dodd) (“[SLUSA] is intended to create a uniform national 
standard for securities fraud class actions involving nationally-traded securities.”); id. 
at S12445 (Letter from Arthur Levitt to Senators D’Amato and Sarbanes (Oct. 9, 
1998)) (“The purpose of the bill is to help ensure that securities fraud class actions 
involving certain securities traded on national markets are governed by a single set of 
uniform standards.”); 144 CONG. REC. H10781 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998) (statement of 
Rep. Cox) (“[SLUSA] will make federal courts the exclusive venue for large-scale 
securities fraud lawsuits involving securities subject to federal regulation”); 144 
CONG. REC. H6058 (daily ed. July 21, 1998) (statement of Rep. Tauzin) (“Lawsuits 
brought on fraud charges both in State and Federal courts can go forward.  They 
simply go forward under the reforms we passed both on the Federal law and now 
conforming that Federal law to the 50 States.”). 
 337. Congress again focused on fraud in enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.  
See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.  The one amendment to private 
rights of action is yet another example of the legislative trend of demarcating 
securities claims based on fraud.  See supra Part III.A. 
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Congress had its chance to address this latest loophole in part (that 
is, in terms of class actions) in CAFA, which targeted forum shopping 
by expanding federal jurisdiction over class actions of national 
interest.338  However, Congress expressly exempted the securities laws 
from CAFA.339  Congress created this exemption despite the fact that 
CAFA echoes the dual intent underlying—but far from fully 
effectuated by—SLUSA:  (1) for federal courts to adjudicate suits of 
national interest, such as those involving nationally traded 
securities;340 and (2) to combat forum shopping via artful pleading.341  
Whereas SLUSA addressed forum shopping by establishing removal 
and preemption of state law causes of action, CAFA allows federal 
courts “in the interests of justice” in certain circumstances to evaluate 
complaints as to (1) the intent for their filing in state rather than 
federal court, and (2) their potential effect on parallel litigation in 
other courts.342 
As to the former discretionary tool, the federal court may now 
exercise diversity jurisdiction where the complaint has been drafted 
in a manner that seeks to avoid federal jurisdiction.343  Specifically, 
the court may assess “whether the plaintiffs have proposed a natural 
class that encompasses all of the people and claims that one would 
expect to include in a class action, as opposed to proposing a class 
that appears to be gerrymandered solely to avoid federal jurisdiction 
by leaving out certain potential class members or claims.”344 
As to the latter, CAFA allows courts to consider whether other 
similar class actions have been recently filed to allow for coordination 
of parallel actions.345  “The purpose of this factor is efficiency and 
fairness:  To determine whether a matter should be subject to Federal 
jurisdiction so that it can be coordinated with other overlapping or 
                                                          
 338. See supra notes 150-153 and accompanying text. 
 339. See supra notes 167-172 and accompanying text. 
 340. Compare supra note 116 (SLUSA) (noting that SLUSA aimed to create 
uniform federal standards for securities traded nationally), with supra notes 150-152, 
157 (CAFA) (explaining how Congress intended CAFA to send class actions of a 
“truly national” nature to federal courts).  
 341. Compare supra notes 116-117 (SLUSA) (describing Congress’s desire to limit 
forum shopping through the passage of SLUSA), with supra notes 153-155, 158-159 
(CAFA) (stating that the primary goal of CAFA was to limit forum shopping in state 
courts in class action litigation). 
 342. Specifically, this additional evaluation of complaints is warranted where 
between one-and two-thirds of the plaintiff class and named defendants are citizens 
of the state in which the action was filed.  See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
§ 4(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(3) (West 2005). 
 343. Id. 
 344. 151 CONG. REC. H730 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. 
Sensenbrenner). 
 345. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(3)(F). 
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parallel class actions.”346  This last factor is to be broadly interpreted 
so that “plaintiffs [cannot] plead around it with creative legal 
theories.”347 
These tactics addressed in CAFA are exactly those left in the wake 
of SLUSA by means of the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act.  As 
made clear in the WorldCom litigation, securities plaintiffs’ lawyers 
have purposefully raised only 1933 Act claims and foregone 1934 Act 
claims simply to remain in state court.348  Furthermore, these state 
filings on virtually identical factual allegations have frustrated the 
management of consolidated actions proceeding on parallel tracks in 
federal court.349  Nonetheless, Congress left these tactics unhindered 
by expressly exempting the federal securities laws from CAFA.350 
These CAFA provisions would serve to curtail this forum shopping 
and its real implications in the securities law context.  Yet the fact that 
CAFA expressly exempts the federal securities laws suggests that an 
extension of CAFA’s measures thereto would directly contradict 
express legislative intent.  However, as described above, it is unclear 
whether Congress understands what that “intent” is.  In other words, 
Congress exempted the federal securities laws from CAFA on the 
assumption that SLUSA resulted in a “carefully crafted framework” 
for federal versus state jurisdiction of federal securities claims.  
Indeed, the disparity between SLUSA’s legislative intent and effect—
and the judicial discord over both the meaning and consequences of 
SLUSA’s amendment—strongly suggest that this framework was not 
so “carefully crafted.” 
At first glance, a simple solution appears to be the repeal of CAFA’s 
exemption of the federal securities laws.  If that were the case, courts 
could discretionarily evaluate complaints for removal purposes only 
in class actions.  As the WorldCom litigation illustrates, however, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers are more than willing to forego class actions to take 
advantage of jurisdictional loopholes.351  Therefore, there must be an 
amendment of the non-removal provision itself to apply to both 
individual and class actions.  Nonetheless, the “sound in fraud” 
demarcation captures the intent of CAFA, as the evaluation of 
complaints for claims “sounding in fraud” would mirror the new 
judicial discretionary tools targeting the forum shopping so palpably 
                                                          
 346. 151 CONG. REC. H728 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. 
Sensenbrenner). 
 347. Id. 
 348. See supra notes 220-223 and accompanying text. 
 349. See supra notes 226-239 and accompanying text. 
 350. See supra notes 167-172 and accompanying text. 
 351. See supra notes 220-223 and accompanying text. 
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addressed generally in Congress’s latest endeavor, but bizarrely 
untouched in terms of the federal securities laws. 
D. Avoiding Piecemeal Litigation under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) 
Demarcating 1933 Act claims for removal purposes based on 
whether they “sound in fraud” would also resolve another 
jurisdictional glitch caused by the non-removal provision:  piecemeal 
litigation under Section 1441(c) of the general removal statutes.  
That statute provides: 
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action 
within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is 
joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes 
of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court 
may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand 
all matters in which State law predominates.352 
Like SLUSA and CAFA, Section 1441(c) was intended to protect 
defendants from forum shopping and artful pleading.  First, if 
defendants can remove a claim invoking federal jurisdiction if sued 
upon alone, “they should not be deprived of that right merely 
because the plaintiff or plaintiffs joined in the state court action 
additional claims that might not support federal subject matter 
jurisdiction.”353  Second, Section 1441(c) serves to promote judicial 
economy by “avoid[ing] piecemeal litigation” of claims which should 
be heard together.354 
Most courts have held that Section 1441(c) trumps federal non-
removal provisions—in other words, that an otherwise non-removable 
claim may be removed if the conditions set forth in Section 1441(c) 
are satisfied.355  One such condition is that the claim raising a federal 
                                                          
 352. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2000). 
 353. David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1988 and 1990 Revisions of Section 1441, in 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1441 (West 1994). 
 354. Id.; see also U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. 1004, 1015 (D. Del. 1972) 
(noting that Section 1441(c)’s purpose is two-fold:  first, to assure that defendants 
will not be prevented from enjoying a federal forum by plaintiffs’ joinder of non-
removable claims that are separate and independent; and second, to promote 
judicial economy by assuring that claims that should be litigated together are 
litigated in the same forum). 
 355. See, e.g., Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 1988); 
Gonsalves v. Amoco Shipping Co., 733 F.2d 1020, 1023-26 (2d Cir. 1984); Newton v. 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 958 F. Supp. 248 (W.D.N.C. 1997); Farmers & 
Merchs. Bank v. Hamilton Hotel Partners of Jacksonville L.P., 702 F. Supp. 1417 
(W.D. Ark. 1988); Palser v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 698 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Mo. 1988); 
Cacioppe v. Superior Holsteins III, Ltd., 650 F. Supp. 607 (S.D. Tex. 1986); Titus v. 
Reynolds Metals Co., 637 F. Supp. 369 (D. Md. 1986); Kinsey v. Nestor Exploration 
Ltd.—1981A, 604 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D. Wash. 1985); Abing v. Paine, Webber, Jackson 
& Curtis, 538 F. Supp. 1193, 1197 (D. Minn. 1982); Hages v. Aliquippa & S. R.R. Co., 
427 F. Supp. 889 (W.D.  Pa. 1977); Armstrong v. Monex Int’l, Ltd., 413 F. Supp. 567 
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question must be “separate and independent” from the non-
removable claim.356  The Supreme Court established that “a separate 
and independent” action does not exist for purposes of Section 
1441(c) if there is “a single wrong to plaintiff . . . arising from an 
interlocked series of transactions.”357  This is true even if a party seeks 
redress for that single wrong under “multiple theories of liability 
against multiple defendants.”358 
This standard is rarely satisfied in the federal securities context, 
given the conflicting jurisdictional provisions of claims under the 
1933 Act and 1934 Act for the same wrongdoing.  Specifically, a 
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim is rarely “separate and independent” 
from an accompanying 1933 Act claim, as both claims are often 
premised on the same underlying fraud.359 This is so even if the 1933 
Act claim, with its lower and fewer pleading requirements, is based 
only on some of the factual allegations underlying the 1934 Act 
claim.360 
                                                          
(N.D. Okla. 1976); Milton R. Barrie Co. v. Levine, 390 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); 
U.S. Indus., Inc., 348 F. Supp. at 1015-16; Meinerz v. Harding Bros. Oil & Gas Co., 343 
F. Supp. 681 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Korber v. Lehman, 221 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).  
But see Gamble v. Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co., 486 F.2d 781, 784 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(commenting that non-removal provision for FELA claims made removing state 
court instituted FELA suits to federal court on any grounds (i.e., Section 1441(c)) 
impossible); Green v. Hajoca Corp., 573 F. Supp. 1120, 1123 (E.D. Va. 1983) 
(holding that “§ 1441(c) is simply inapplicable to” statutorily non-removable claims). 
 356. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). 
 357. Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14 (1951). 
 358. Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 817 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 359. See, e.g., Crowe v. Deutsch Bank, 330 F. Supp. 2d 813, 817 (S.D. Miss. 2004) 
(remanding case containing 1933 Act, 1934 Act, and state law claims because “the 
1934 Act claim cannot fairly be said to be ‘separate and independent’ from the 1933 
Act claim” within the contemplation of Section 1441(c)); Shorty v. Top Rank of La., 
Inc., 876 F. Supp. 838, 840 (E.D. La. 1995) (“The 1934 Act claim is not separate and 
independent from the 1933 Act claim because both involve a single wrong to the 
plaintiffs.”).  1933 Act claims have also been kept out of federal court when not 
“separate and independent” from other federal law claims or, prior to the 
amendment of Section 1441(c) in 1990, state law claims giving rise to diversity 
jurisdiction.  See Emrich, 846 F.2d at 1197 (remanding 1933 Act claim because the 
asserted RICO claim was not “separate and independent” from the 1933 Act claim); 
Peoples Nat’l Bank v. Darling, No. 91-1052-K, 1991 WL 45716, at *6 (D. Kan. Apr. 1, 
1991) (remanding multi-count case to state court where 1933 Act claims were simply 
interlocked and closely related “alternative theories of liability” seeking single relief 
for one wrong); Abing, 538 F. Supp. at 1197 (remanding entire action where 1933 Act 
claim not separate and independent from Investment Advisers Act and state law 
claims asserting same “right to be dealt with in an open, fair, and professional 
manner in their business transactions”); Milton R. Barrie Co., Inc., 390 F. Supp. at 477 
(remanding both state law and 1933 Act claims as “alternative theories of recovery 
for the single wrong . . . as a result of defendants’ alleged misrepresentations”); Pinto 
v. Maremont Corp., 326 F. Supp. 165, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Korber, 221 F. Supp. at 
359-60. 
 360. See Crowe, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 818 (reasoning that, though plaintiff’s 1934 Act 
claim appeared to encompass a broader range of conduct than did his 1933 Act 
claim, the alleged misrepresentations that form the basis of the 1933 Act claim fall 
COOK.OFFTOPRINTER 2/22/2006  2:34:45 PM 
2006] RECRAFTING THE JURISDICTIONAL FRAMEWORK 677 
Courts have already confronted the forum shopping inherent in 
the pleading of dependent non-removable (e.g., 1933 Act) claims to 
prevent removal under Section 1441(c).  One prominent means 
established for that purpose has been the “fraudulent joinder” 
concept, under which the merits of the “otherwise non-removable 
claims” are preliminarily assessed under a “summary judgment-like 
procedure . . . that as a matter of law there was no reasonable basis 
for predicting that the plaintiff might establish liability.”361  However, 
that burden is a “heavy one.”362  Moreover, that burden is often 
insurmountable in terms of 1933 Act claims given the fact that a 
plaintiff is more likely to satisfy the lower substantive and pleading 
requirements of a 1933 Act claim as compared to the accompanying 
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim.363 
Because the fraudulent joinder rule has little effect with respect to 
1933 Act claims, an additional tool to combat the loopholes of 
Section 1441(c) is necessary.  The proposed amendment would serve 
that purpose.  1933 Act claims which “sound in fraud” are those 
which are not “separate and independent” from nominal fraud 
claims, such as those under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5, because they 
are based most likely on the same allegations of wrongdoing.  
Whereas 1933 Act claims “sounding in fraud” rarely—if ever—are 
“separate and independent” from Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claims, 
the proposed amendment would eliminate the other precondition to 
Section 1441(c):  their non-removability.  In other words, Section 
1441(c) is not even implicated if the claims are removable in the first 
                                                          
within the range of conduct underlying the 1934 Act claim as not to be a “separate 
and independent” claim). 
 361. Burchett v. Cargill, Inc., 48 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting B., Inc. v. 
Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also Feichko v. Denver & 
Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 213 F.3d 586, 589 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting in dicta “that a 
fraudulent attempt to evade removal may provide an exception to the operation of 
[a non-removal provision]”); Lackey v. Atl. Richfield Co., 990 F.2d 202, 207 (5th Cir. 
1993) (allowing removing party to show that “the [non-removable] Jones Act claim 
has been fraudulently pleaded to prevent removal”); Hutton v. Consol. Grain & 
Barge Co., 170 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (C.D. Ill. 2001) (“When a plaintiff has alleged a 
claim that is not removable . . . , the Court can look beyond the pleadings to 
determine whether plaintiff has any chance of prevailing on the nonremovable 
claim.”). 
 362. Burchett, 48 F.3d at 176. 
 363. See, e.g., Milton R. Barrie Co., 390 F. Supp. at 477 (reasoning that 1933 Act 
claim was not so baseless even if complaint was amended to add such claim as “part 
of plaintiff’s ‘unworthy scheme’ to ‘oust’ the federal court of jurisdiction”); Korber, 
221 F. Supp. at 360 (determining that a 1933 Act claim not “so farfetched that its 
inclusion in the complaint is a fraud on the jurisdiction of [the] Court”).  However, 
1933 Act claims have been found to be “fraudulently joined” based on fundamental 
legal—as opposed to mere pleading—deficiencies.  See, e.g., Bennett v. Bally Mfg. 
Corp., 785 F. Supp. 559, 562 (D.S.C. 1992) (finding 1933 Act claim “fraudulently 
joined” because “§ 12(2) does not apply to secondary market transactions”). 
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place.  Therefore, rather than being partitioned under that removal 
statute, the entire case could be efficiently heard in federal court if 
1933 Act claims “sounding in fraud” were removable. 
E. Fairness to Defrauded Investors 
In its current state, the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act has 
led to a “race for the assets” as plaintiffs seek recovery for securities 
fraud in both individual and class actions in both state and federal 
courts.  While offering a wider choice of forum, these permutations 
actually disserve plaintiffs in many respects.  As an initial matter, the 
costs incurred by defendants in duplicative litigation deplete the 
funds from which plaintiffs are eventually paid.  “As deep as some of 
the pockets in this action may be, they are in all likelihood not 
limitless.”364  In effect, the pendency of parallel actions in an array of 
state courts undermines the efficiencies otherwise achievable by the 
consolidation of related actions in federal court.365 
This disparate playing field promises not only fewer assets for 
defrauded investors, but unfair distribution among them.  Plaintiffs 
face various procedural and substantive requirements in the range of 
litigation spurned by the jurisdictional provisions of the federal 
securities laws, depending on whether they proceed in state court 
versus federal court, and in individual actions versus class actions.  As 
a result, plaintiffs could be subject to inconsistent rulings in these 
different venues with potentially preclusive effect on other actions.366  
Moreover, plaintiffs in individual actions and/or state court would 
not enjoy the PSLRA’s procedural safeguards for plaintiff class 
members against their lawyers.367 
The proposal herein would alleviate these equitable concerns.  
First, if all securities actions “sounding in fraud” were in federal 
court, judicial efficiency would be achieved by the consolidation of all 
                                                          
 364. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 B.R. 308, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 365. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000) (permitting the transfer of multidistrict litigation 
into a consolidated proceeding in the interest of efficiency). 
 366. See In re King Pharms., Inc., Case No. 2:03-CV-77, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Tenn. 
Feb. 6, 2004) (warning that parallel litigation of 1933 Act claims in state court and 
1934 Act claims in federal court “asserting substantially similar claims . . . could lead 
to considerable confusion if not outright inconsistent results”); In re WorldCom, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 315 F. Supp. 2d 527, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 367. See supra notes 104-105, 107-108 and accompanying text. Investors may not be 
made aware of these differences, as it is not necessarily in plaintiffs’ lawyers’ personal 
interests to disclose them.  In fact, Judge Cote found the differences substantial 
enough—and the disclosures by plaintiffs’ lawyers deficient enough—to require 
curative notices be sent to plaintiffs both before her and in individual actions in state 
courts around the country.  In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. Civ.02-3288, 2003 
WL 22701241, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2003). 
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related individual and class actions at least for pretrial purposes.  
Second, without the jurisdictional loophole, plaintiffs’ lawyers may 
see less advantage in filing 1933 Act claims “sounding fraud” than 
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claims.  With more plaintiffs proceeding 
on the same allegations of wrongdoing under the same procedural 
and substantive standards and in the same forum, their recovery 
could be both more widely and equitably distributed. 
CONCLUSION 
A “sound in fraud” demarcation of 1933 Act claims for 
jurisdictional purposes would both remedy the many problems and 
procure the many benefits identified in this Article.  This 
demarcation would harmonize the jurisdictional framework of the 
federal securities laws with various expressions of legislative intent.  
First, the original intent of the non-removal provision of the 1933 Act 
would be preserved, as plaintiffs could still choose to have their 1933 
Act claims heard in state court if pled in a certain fashion—that is, 
not premised on underlying fraudulent conduct.  Second, the 
demarcation would strengthen the historic interrelation of the 1933 
Act and 1934 Act, which are meant to offer “distinct causes of action 
and are intended to address different types of wrongdoing.”368  Third, 
the removal of 1933 Act claims “sounding in fraud” would fulfill 
SLUSA’s endeavor to have all claims “alleging fraud” regarding 
nationally traded securities administered in federal court under 
uniform standards, and would be consistent with the measures 
recently espoused by Congress in CAFA. 
One likely criticism of this proposal is that it would still leave a 
loophole for the filing of 1933 Act claims in state court—plaintiffs 
could simply proceed in state court under theories of negligence and 
strict liability.  However, this “loophole” would largely remain in 
theory given the real consequences accompanying its use.  To remain 
in state court under this scenario, plaintiffs would have to forego any 
allegations of fraud that might otherwise support their claims.  It is 
unlikely that plaintiffs’ lawyers equipped with such allegations would 
eviscerate federal securities claims just for jurisdictional purposes.  If 
there were in fact no allegations of fraud supporting the claims, then 
plaintiffs would still have the choice of forum intended by the non-
removal provision.  Indeed, Congress has never expressed an intent 
to disrupt that choice of forum, as it has only sought to have all 
                                                          
 368. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381 (1983). 
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claims “alleging fraud” heard in federal court.369  Moreover, whereas 
securities fraud actions have become increasingly federalized through 
a series of unique substantive and procedural requirements under 
federal law (and applicable only in federal court), 1933 Act claims 
premised merely on negligence and strict liability remain largely 
analogous to state common law actions.  Therefore, such claims are 
particularly suitable for adjudication by state courts. 
Another likely criticism of a “sound in fraud” approach is the 
introduction of even more ambiguity and consequential uncertainty 
in judicial interpretations of the non-removal provision of the 1933 
Act.370  As an initial matter, this demarcation is not a foreign concept 
in federal securities legislation and jurisprudence.  In fact, Congress’s 
only change to private causes of action under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
took this exact form, and courts have been rather uniform in 
deciding what 1933 Act claims “sound in fraud.”371  Moreover, forum 
shopping by its very nature thrives on exceptions to rules, and 
therefore may be best addressed by more flexible standards.  Indeed, 
Congress saw fit in CAFA to give federal courts the discretion to 
evaluate complaints to ensure that federal courts adjudicate suits of 
national interest and to provide equity and efficiency in parallel 
litigation that would otherwise be waged in various fora.  A similar 
evaluation of both individual and class action complaints for claims 
“sounding in fraud” would serve these dual intents underlying but far 
from effectuated by SLUSA. 
Investor protection from fraud has been the overriding goal of 
Congress with respect to the private causes of action under the 
federal securities laws—either from those committing fraud or those 
raising allegations of fraud purportedly on their behalf.  The non-
removal provision of the 1933 Act was a rare step in one direction, 
and has failed to reach equipoise amidst the rising conflict of those 
                                                          
 369. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 2, Pub. L. No. 105-
353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 370. Indeed, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was widely criticized for its ambiguous 
language in establishing an express limitations period for any federal securities claim 
“involv[ing]” fraud.  See supra note 142. 
 371. See supra Part III.B.  However, one apparent discrepancy is whether 1933 Act 
claims for which all fraud allegations are expressly disavowed may still “sound in 
fraud.”  Compare Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 160 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (holding that for purposes of Rule 9(b), disavowal of fraud allegations is 
“insufficient to divorce the claims from their fraudulent underpinnings”), with 
Ballard v. Tyco Int’l, No. 02-MD-1335-PB, 2005 WL 928537, *4 n.4 (D.N.H. Apr. 22, 
2005) (“Plaintiffs expressly state in their complaint that their § 11 claim . . . ‘does not 
sound in fraud’ and that ‘[a]ll of the preceding allegations of fraud or fraudulent 
conduct and/or motive are specifically excluded from this Count.’”).  Such 1933 Act 
claims should be deemed to “sound in fraud” so that the problems identified herein 
are not perpetuated by the simple disavowal of allegations. 
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forces over time.  In effect, Congress has transformed the choice of 
forum inherent in that provision from an asset to plaintiffs against 
corporate wrongdoers, to a liability in the hands of plaintiffs’ lawyers 
who have used it to file duplicative litigation to the detriment of their 
clients.  A “sound in fraud” demarcation, however, would recognize 
the unique role of fraud in 1933 Act claims and would harmonize 
both forms of investor protection which, despite their conflicts, 
themselves “sound in fraud.”  By coming to terms with its own 
oversights and heeding its recent enactments in the manner 
proposed here, Congress could finally achieve its goal of closing the 
jurisdictional loopholes in federal securities litigation. 
 
